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Griffin: Safety and Efficacy of Orthopaedic Surgical Devices Under the FDA

Safety and Efficacy of Orthopaedic Surgical
Devices Under the FDA’s Updated
Premarket Notification Program
Frank Griffin, M.D., J.D.*
“The enemy of good is better.”1

ABSTRACT
Orthopaedic surgical devices are recalled 11.5 times more when they obtain U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) clearance by Premarket Notification (“510(k)”) than when they are cleared via the more vigorous Premarket Approval (“PMA”) review. Recall of implanted orthopaedic devices
can be devastating for patients – especially if the device must be removed or
revised. 510(k) approval is also associated with other negative outcome issues
among orthopaedic devices – including outlier devices, new devices underperforming their predicate ancestors, and significant statistical risks – which are
discussed in this paper. In November 2018, the FDA announced changes to
510(k) including: (1) increasing premarket expectations for device submissions, (2) implementing a “Refuse-to-Accept” policy for incomplete applications, (3) improving the consistency and thoroughness of device review, (4)
eliminating the use of 510(k) for devices considered to be of higher risk (i.e.,
Class III devices), and (5) eliminating over 1000 devices as 510(k) legal predicates. This article (1) explores the recent changes to 510(k) outlined by the
FDA in 2018, (2) evaluates their likely effects on the outcomes of orthopaedic
devices, and (3) proposes solutions to improve those outcomes, including FDA
regulatory changes, litigation changes with regard to informed consent and
Daubert rulings, and Congressional actions to hold device manufacturers more
accountable based upon models currently in place affecting hospitals, doctors,
and nursing homes.

* Dr. Griffin is the Health Law Scholar in Residence and Adjunct Professor at the Uni-

versity of Arkansas School of Law and is an Adjunct Clinical Assistant Professor, Division of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences.
1. English variant of Italian proverb popularized by Voltaire in the 1600s. See
SUSAN RATCLIFFE, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 389 (6th ed. 2011).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Orthopaedic surgical devices are recalled 11.5 times more commonly
when they obtain FDA clearance by Premarket Notification (“510(k)”) than
when they are cleared via the more vigorous Premarket Approval (“PMA”)
review.2 Recall of implanted orthopaedic devices that have been affixed to or
implanted within a large bone, like the femur, can be devastating for patients –
especially if the device must be removed or revised. For example, Medicare
patients undergoing revision total hip replacements are at risk for infection
(17.3%), blood clots (i.e., venous thromboembolic disease; 11.1%), dislocation
(5.43%), pulmonary embolism (3.24%), and death (2.11%).3 Due to the significant potential for life-altering consequences of revision of recalled medical
devices affixed to or implanted within large bones, recall of orthopaedic devices is unacceptable and the FDA should optimize orthopaedic device clearance pathways to minimize the chances that approved devices will later be recalled.
The FDA clears implantable medical devices using two main pathways:
PMA review and 510(k).4 The PMA pathway is longer, more expensive, and
requires clinical trials confirming safety and efficacy.5 The law presumes that
implantable medical devices will undergo PMA review;6 but 510(k) provides
a shortcut for most devices if the manufacturer/marketer (“submitter”) can
show that the new device is “at least as safe and effective” (i.e., “substantially
equivalent”) as a device that is already being legally marketed (i.e., a “predicate” device).7 The 510(k) program is the most common pre-market regulatory

2. Charles S. Day et al., Analysis of FDA-Approved Orthopaedic Devices and
Their Recalls, 98 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 517, 517 (2016) (concluding, “Given that
510(k)-cleared devices were 11.5 times more likely to be recalled than PMA-approved
devices, it is concerning that most orthopaedic devices are cleared through the 510(k)
process with limited clinical trials data.”).
3. Sameer Badarudeen et al., Complications After Revision Total Hip Arthroplasty in the Medicare Population, 32 J. ARTHROPLASTY 1954, 1954 (2017).
4. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477–79 (1996) (noting that the 510(k)
notification process is not comparable to the PMA process because the 510(k) review
is “completed in an average of only twenty hours” whereas 1200 hours is necessary to
complete a PMA review); see also Day et al., supra note 2, at 518 (describing 510(k)
and PMA pathways); Kyle M. Fargen et al., The FDA Approval Process for Medical
Devices: An Inherently Flawed System or a Valuable Pathway for Innovation?, 5 J.
NEUROINTERVENTIONAL SURGERY 269, 271–72 (2013) (describing the approval pathways for medical devices).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2012).
6. § 360c(c)(2)(C)(1); § 360c(a)(1)(C)
7. § 360c(2)(C)(ii)(II); § 360c(c)(2)(C) (noting the 510(k) pathway allows for
rapid approval of medical devices that are “substantially equivalent” to existing legallymarketed devices); 21 CFR § 807.92(a)(3) (2019); Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S.
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review pathway for new medical devices.8 In 2017, the FDA cleared 82% of
its approved or cleared devices via the 510(k) pathway.9
In November 2018, the FDA announced changes to 510(k).10 In response
to vociferous criticism of 510(k), the FDA asked the Institute of Medicine
(“IOM”) to review 510(k) in 2011 and to make recommendations to protect the
public health while also protecting legitimate industry interests.11 The IOM
concluded that the 510(k) process was fatally “flawed,”12 that it generally does
not evaluate safety and efficacy, and cannot be transformed into such a process.13 In addition, the IOM noted that 510(k) “lacks the statutory basis to be
a reliable premarket screen for safety and effectiveness” of moderate risk devices and recommended that Congress replace the system.14 However, Congress failed to act.

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-notification-510k [perma.cc/EZ4W-U2S3]; see Medtronic, Inc., 518
U.S. at 478; Day, supra note 2, at 518.
8. FDA has taken steps to strengthen the 510(k) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. 3 (November 2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM626541.pdf
[perma.cc/2KNP-L6KM] [hereinafter, FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k)].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH,
MEDICAL DEVICES AND PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT
35 YEARS (2011), https://www.nap.edu/read/13150/ [hereinafter IOM REPORT]; see,
Barry Meier, The Implants Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/business/17hip.html [perma.cc/F9AF-SZMM] (reporting on potential problems with several devices that had been cleared through the 510(k) process,
including an artificial hip); Dangerous Medical Implants and Devices: Most Medical
Implants Have Never Been Tested for Safety, CONSUMER REPS. (May 2012), http://consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/04/cr-investigates-dangerous-medical-devices/index.htm [perma.cc/Q8UR-KEHQ] (detailing deficiencies in products as a result
of the 501(k) process); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Vows to Revoke Approval of Device,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), https://nyti.ms/2JS67WH [perma.cc/Y595-Q9U4] (noting
that politics trumped science in the approval of a knee patch); Gardiner Harris, U.S.
Inaction Lets Look-Alike Tubes Kill Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2010),
https://nyti.ms/2mfjDI6 [perma.cc/F6NA-2CN9] (noting resistance from the medical
device industry and an approval process that discourages safety-related changes as factors in deaths related to some tubing connections); Alicia Mundy & Jared A. Favole,
FDA Rips Approval of Medical Device, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2009),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125382260933538517 [perma.cc/6RKP-9LRH] (noting that Congressional pressure damaged the integrity of the FDA’s approval process).
12. IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
13. Id. at 2–3.
14. Id. at 2.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/8

4

Griffin: Safety and Efficacy of Orthopaedic Surgical Devices Under the FDA

2019]

ORTHOPAEDIC SURGICAL DEVICES

783

The FDA’s recent 510(k) changes15 appear to be an attempt to address
some of the concerns and offset Congress’ lack of action. The FDA’s November 2018 report outlined changes to strengthen the program, including: (1) increasing premarket expectations for device submissions, (2) implementing a
“Refuse-to-Accept” policy for incomplete applications, (3) improving the consistency and thoroughness of device review, (4) eliminating the use of 510(k)
for devices considered to be of higher risk (i.e., Class III devices), and (5) eliminating over 1000 devices as 510(k) legal predicates.16
First, this Article explores the recent changes to 510(k) outlined by the
FDA in 2018. Then, it evaluates their likely effects on the outcomes of orthopaedic devices. Finally, this Article proposes solutions to improve those outcomes.

II. FDA’S RECENT CHANGES TO THE 510(K) PATHWAY
Late in 2018, the FDA announced changes to the 510k pathway to
“strengthen” the path and highlighted some of the changes that have been occurring over the past several years.17 These changes include that the FDA has
(1) “increased its premarket expectations for 510(k) submissions,” (2) “implemented a Refuse-To-Accept policy to improve the quality of 510(k) submissions,” (3) “improved consistency and thoroughness of 510(k) review,” (4)
“taken steps to eliminate the use of 510(k) for Class III devices,” and (5) “eliminated the use of more than 1000 510(k)s as legal predicates.” 18

A. Increased Premarket Expectations for 510(k) Submissions
According to the FDA’s report, the increased premarket expectations are
primarily (1) the completion of more pages of paperwork and (2) the incorporation of benefit/risk factors into the paperwork analysis.19

1. More pages of paperwork
In 2017, the FDA updated its 510(k) Modifications Guidance for companies making changes to existing devices,20 including how to incorporate Benefit-Risk Factors.21 The FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health
(“CDRH”) published over 50 guidance documents since 2009 “to help improve

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
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predictability, consistency, and transparency of submission content while clarifying expectations, policies[,] and procedures surrounding review of the submission.”22 The “average number of pages for each 510(k) has increased 150%
since 2009” such that the average number of pages was 1,185 for each 510(k)
submission in 2017.23

2. Incorporation of Benefit/Risk factors
The FDA encourages inclusion of benefit and risk factors in the 510(k)
application and notes that benefit and risk factors are considered during assessment of devices; the FDA provides examples of benefits and risks that should
be included.24
Possible device benefits may include (among others): (1) “Reduction in
treatment time to achieve same effect”; (2) “Improvement of mechanical properties to reduce probable likelihood of adverse events or to improve handling”;
(3) “Reduction of variability in device output”; and (4) “Improvements in clinical management, probability of survival, other aspects of patient health status
(e.g., effect on patient management and quality of life, improvement of patient
function, prevention of loss of function, relief from symptoms), and patient
satisfaction in the target population, which may be measured with the use of
PROs.”25 In considering benefits, the FDA assesses information provided in
the 510(k) by comparing potential benefits to the predicate device.26
Possible device risks are likewise considered. In assessing risks, the FDA
considers “among others, the following factors individually and in the aggregate as compared to the predicate device: (1) Severity, Types, Number, and
Rates of Harmful events; (2) Probability of a Harmful Event; (3) Probability of
the Patient Experiencing One or More Harmful Events; and (4) Duration of
Harmful Events.”27 Risk assessment is discussed further below in relation to
orthopaedic devices.
Additional factors considered in the benefit/risk assessment include (1)
uncertainty, (2) characterization of the disease/condition, (3) innovative technology, (4) patient tolerance for risk and perspective on benefit, (5) benefit for

Id.
Id.
Id.
Benefit-Risk Factors to Consider When Determining Substantial Equivalence
in Premarket Notifications (510(k)) with Different Technological Characteristics, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 12–13 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM404773.pdf
[perma.cc/M836-UJVH] [hereinafter FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS].
26. Id. at 13–14 (considering the following in comparison to the predicate device:
(1) magnitude of benefits, (2) probability of the patient experiencing benefits, and (3)
duration of effects).
27. Id. at 14–15.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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the health care professional or caregiver, (6) risk mitigation, and (7) postmarket
data.28

B. Refuse-To-Accept Policy
To determine whether an application is administratively complete, the
FDA does a review within 15 days of receipt.29 The FDA updated its “Refuseto-Accept” policy in January 2018; procedures were implemented, including
criteria to assess “whether a 510(k) submission meets a quality threshold of
acceptability for review” by evaluating submissions for completeness related
to 52 elements – including biocompatibility, shelf life, performance data, and
others.30 If any one of the 52 elements is missing, the submitter is notified that
the submission is not accepted for review; roughly 30% fall into this category
initially.31 This is not a substantive review, just an initial checklist review for
completeness of the application.32

C. Improved Consistency and Thoroughness
To improve consistency and thoroughness, the FDA created the 510(k)
SMART memo template for use by FDA reviewers for guidance during the
510(k) premarket process.33 The FDA instituted the SMART memo template
for mandatory use beginning in October 2015, and it guides the FDA’s review
staff “by providing helpful links to applicable regulations and guidances [sic]
and facilitating consistent analysis and documentation of scientific, clinical,
administrative and regulatory information.” 34 In addition, “the SMART memo
template is frequently updated to incorporate new review practices and policies, such as those published in final guidance to ensure a contemporary approach to 510(k) review” and includes “foundational and device-specific guidance.”35 In addition, the SMART memo template training has been incorporated into the FDA’s Reviewer Certification Program.36

28. Id. at 16–18.
29. Refuse to Accept Policy for 510(k)s, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 3 (2019),

https://www.fda.gov/media/83888/download [perma.cc/4G5P-4CDS] [hereinafter
FDA Refuse to Accept Policy].
30. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 5.
31. Id. at 5.
32. FDA Refuse to Accept Policy, supra note 29, at 3 (noting the purpose of the
policy is to “whether a 510(k) submission meets a minimum threshold of acceptability
and should be accepted for substantive review”).
33. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 6.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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As a result, the FDA’s staff now spends more time reviewing each 510(k)
submission “than ever before.”37 This is partially due to the 150% increase in
the number of pages involved in each submission.38 The FDA estimates that
its reviewers now spend twice as much time reviewing each 510(k) as they did
just fifteen years ago and 32% more time than they did in 2009.39 Even with
these increased time commitments, “the FDA has continued to meet its Congressionally established review performance timelines.”40

D. Elimination of 510(k) for Class III Devices
The FDA’s “oversight of devices is tailored to three risk-based classification[s]”: Classes I, II, and III.41 Class I devices make up around 50% of all
medical devices, are considered least risky, and can generally be marketed in
the United States without prior FDA review.42 Elastic bandages and color
change thermometers are examples of Class I devices.43 Orthopaedic examples
include basic manual surgical instruments44 (e.g., needle holders, scissors,
rongeurs, etc.), cast removal instruments,45 etc.46 Class I device makers are
subject to “reporting, labeling, and good manufacturing practice requirements.”47
Class II devices make up about 43% of all medical devices and generally
require FDA review of 510(k) submissions.48 Examples include glucose test
strips and infusion pumps.49 Orthopaedic examples include most primary total

37. Id.
38. Id. (noting “Since 2009, the time spent reviewing each 510(k) submission has

increased 32%, and it has almost doubled in the past 15 years.”).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Medical Device Safety Action Plan: Protecting Patients, Promoting Public
Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 3 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/112497/download [perma.cc/U5QP-EE3E] [hereinafter FDA Safety Action Plan].
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id.
44. 21 C.F.R. § 888.4540 (2019).
45. § 888.5960.
46. For a complete list of medical devices, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 888.
47. FDA Safety Action Plan, supra note 41, at 3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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knee replacement devices,50 most primary total hip replacement devices,51 intramedullary fixation rods,52 PMMA bone cement,53 thoracolumbosacral pedicle screw system,54 plate/screw fixation devices,55 and others.56 In 2017, the
FDA approved over 3000 class II devices.57
Class III devices are those “with [the] greatest risk to patients.”58 Class
III devices generally require Premarket Applications (“PMAs”) “containing
clinical and nonclinical data to determine whether there is a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.”59 Prior to 2018, some Class III devices could
be cleared via 510(k).60 But as a result of these recent changes, “not a single
Class III device was cleared via the 510(k) process in 2018.”61 In 2017, the
FDA approved 64 PMA devices.62 Orthopaedic examples of Class III devices
include some metal on metal hips (as of 2016 after lawsuits), constrained total
knees, knee hemiarthroplasty, and others.63

21 C.F.R. §§ 888.3490, 3500, 3520 (2019).
§§ 888.3340, 3350, 3353, 3358, 3360, 3390.
§§ 888.3020, 3023.
§ 888.3027.
§ 888.3070.
§ 888.3030.
For a complete list of medical devices, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 888 (2019).
FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 3 (noting 3173 devices were
cleared in 2017); see also, 510(K) DEVICES CLEARED IN 2017, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm540522.htm [perma.cc/9KU9-QWPT]
(last visited February 5, 2019).
58. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 7.
59. Id.; FDA Safety Action Plan, supra note 41, at 3.
60. FDA Steps to Strengthen 501(k), supra note 8, at 7.
Class III devices must generally obtain an approved Premarket Approval (PMA) application, but some device types on the market prior to the 1976 Medical Device Amendments were placed into Class III and may be cleared via the 510(k) process until the
FDA issues regulations either requiring submission of a Premarket Approval application or down-classifying the device types into Class I or Class II. Between 2003 and
2009, the FDA annually cleared approximately 80 submissions for Class III devices
through the 510(k) process. As of August 2009, 25 Class III device types were still
eligible for the 510(k) process. Between 2011 and 2016, the FDA published 24 final
rules and orders, either down-classifying the device types to Class I or Class II or requiring the submission of a Premarket Approval application and eliminating the use of
the 510(k) process for evaluation of these high-risk medical devices. Id.
61. Id.
62. FDA Safety Action Plan, supra note 41, at 3.
63. 21 CFR §§ 888.3320, 888.3330 (2019) (metal on metal hips); § 888.3550 (constrained total knee); § 888.3570 (knee hemiarthroplasty). For a complete list of medical
devices, see generally 20 C.F.R. § 888 (2019).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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E. Elimination of More Than 1000 Devices as Legal Predicates
The FDA takes action to eliminate the use of devices previously cleared
by 510(k) as predicates “when it raises safety concerns.”64 For example, the
FDA may reclassify a device from Class II to Class III and call for Premarket
Approval applications “when [it] determine[s] that a device type should be regulated as high risk because general and special controls are not sufficient to
assure its safety and effectiveness.”65 This process eliminates some previously
cleared 510(k)s as legal predicates.66 Elimination of predicates has become
more common in recent years, with 84% of predicates being eliminated in the
past 6 years and a thirty-fold increase in the annual rate of elimination of 510(k)
predicates since 2012.67 A total of 1,477 predicates have been eliminated since
2012.68

III. ORTHOPAEDIC IMPLANTS, 510(K), AND LIKELY EFFECTS OF FDA
CHANGES
In addition to the fact that 510(k) leads to an 11.5 times higher risk of
device recall than PMA for orthopaedic devices, there have been other negative
side effects of 510(k) on orthopaedic devices. This section first reviews the
history of 510(k) orthopaedic device concerns using a few specific examples.
Then, with that orthopaedic device history in mind, this section analyzes the
FDA’s 2018 changes to strengthen 510(k).

A. 510(k) and Orthopaedic Implants
The 510(k) program has affected orthopaedic implants in three distinct
ways. First, 510(k) has facilitated orthopaedic device races with new devices
often promoted before the patient outcomes of earlier predicate versions can be
scientifically evaluated. Second, 510(k) has resulted in some examples of devices with higher and unexpected severe complications for patients than their
predicate devices. Third, 510(k) has helped lead to the finding that sometimes
older predicate orthopaedic devices have better long-term outcomes than their
510(k) descendants.

1. The 510(k) facilitated orthopaedic device “races”
From the 1980s through the 2000s, total joint replacement components
were modified so quickly that there was almost no time for outcome assessment
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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before the next modification hit the market. Augusto Sarmiento, a well-known
orthopaedic surgeon, innovator, and leader, observed that one device manufacturer’s company president considered the successful outcomes of an earlier version of one total hip to be “totally irrelevant data” to consider in the next version.69 Sarmiento is a former president of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons70 and former chairman of the Department of Orthopaedic Surgery at the University of Southern California.71 The company president explained to Dr. Sarmiento that “by the time his company released a new prosthesis to the public, they had already begun work on the next version.”72 Because of this, there was no time for scientific analysis and feedback from patients and surgeons on the earlier version – often possibly a “predicate” device
– to be considered in the next device. In a recent Mayo Clinic study, researchers similarly observed “newer and more expensive implants are rapidly adopted
in clinical practice with limited evidence of their effectiveness in comparison
with existing ones.”73
As an example, the evolution of one part of the total knee replacement –
the tibial component – demonstrates the phenomenon. The modern total knee
arthroplasty (“TKA” or “total knee replacement”) consists of three parts: (1)
the tibial component, (2) the femoral component, and (3) the patellar component.74 The tibial component attaches to the lower leg bone (tibia) and is the
focus of this example. Numerous companies developed TKAs, but for simplicity, this section will focus mostly on one company’s line with which I am
most familiar75 and note that other companies’ TKAs developed along somewhat parallel timelines.
69. AUGUSTO SARMIENTO, M.D., BARE BONES: A SURGEON’S TALE: THE PRICE OF
SUCCESS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE 286 (2003).
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. H.M. Kremers et al., Comparative Survivorship of Different Tibial Designs in
Primary Total Knee Arthroplasty, 96 J. BONE & JOINT SURG e121, 1 (2014).
74. The exact number of modifications to total knee design is likely impossible to
determine because companies use different terminology in the FDA’s database for total
knee components. For example: two hundred, eighty-five entries are found when “total
knee” is placed in the “device name” field in the FDA’s 510(k) Premarket Notification
search database. 510(K) PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS, U.S. FOOD. AND DRUG. ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm [perma.cc/VBH7GKNJ]. However, additional total knee components are found when searching under
“tibial,” “femoral,” “patellar,” “polyethylene,” and potentially countless other search
terms. Similar findings are likely with regard to the patellar and femoral components.
75. Disclosure: The author implanted Zimmer® NexGen® Legacy™ PS total
knees throughout his career as an orthopaedic surgeon. The author completed a fellowship in knee reconstruction and sports medicine under the tutelage of Dr. Insall and his
colleagues at the Insall-Scott-Kelly (ISK) Institute in New York City in 1996–97 and
has co-authored several papers with Dr. Insall. See e.g., Frank M. Griffin et al., Accuracy of Soft Tissue Balancing in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 15(8) J ARTHROPLASTY 970
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The tibial component is particularly important to TKA outcomes and has
been modified via the 510(k) process many times with over 100 different models being on the market over the past twenty-five years.76 Generally, the tibial
component began as an all-polyethylene (“all-poly”) device, evolved into a
fixed polyethylene and metal device (“nonmodular, metal-backed”), and
emerged into the modular polyethylene and metal device (“modular, metalbacked”) used most commonly today.77 An early example of a TKA with an
all-poly tibial component was the Total Condylar Prosthesis (“TCP”; noted as
the “first total knee of modern design”).78 The TCP was in use prior to the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 – known as a pre-amendments device –
and can serve as a predicate device in the 510(k) process.79 The TCP was modified at least once after 510(k) approvals began.80 In 1978, the TCP was modified to become the Insall-Burnstein (“IB1”) knee, still with the all-poly tibial

(2000); Frank M. Griffin et al., The Posterior Condylar Angle in Osteoarthritic Knees,
13(7) J ARTHROPLASTY 821 (1998); Frank M. Griffin et al., Total Knee Arthroplasty in
Patients Who Were Obese with 10 Years Follow-up, 356 CLIN ORTHOP REL RES 28
(1998); Frank M. Griffin et al., Anatomy of the Epicondyles of the Distal Femur, 15(3)
J ARTHROPLASTY 354 (2000); For a profile of Dr. Insall, see Giles R. Scuderi et al., The
Insall Legacy in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 392 CLIN ORTHOP REL RES 3–14 (2001).
76. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 6 (noting that “>100 tibial implants are available in the U.S. market”).
77. INSALL ET AL., SURGERY OF THE KNEE 690 (2d ed. 1993); Saverio Comitini et
al., Evolution in Knee Replacement Implant, 4 SINGLE CELL BIOL. 109, 109 (2014);
Chitranjan S. Ranawat and Thomas P. Sculco, History of the Development of Total
Knee Prosthesis at the Hospital for Special Surgery, TOTAL-CONDYLAR KNEE
ARTHROPLASTY 3–6 (1985); R.D. Scott, Duopatellar Total Knee Replacement: The
Brigham Experience, 13 ORTHOP CLIN NORTH AM 89–102 (1982); Luca Amendola et
al., History of Condylar Total Knee Arthroplasty, RECENT ADVANCES IN HIP AND KNEE
ARTHROPLASTY 203, 204 (2012). Also note a discussion of the posterior-stabilized,
cruciate-sacrificing total knee development versus the cruciate sacrificing knees is beyond the scope of this article.
78. A.L. Malkani et al., Total Knee Arthroplasty with the Kinematic Condylar
Prosthesis: A Ten Year Follow-up Study, 77 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 423 (1995) (noting
“the total condylar prosthesis is the prototype from which most current total knee prostheses were derived” and was introduced in New York City in 1974).
79. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a)(3) (2019) (noting, “A legally marketed device to which
a new device may be compared for a determination regarding substantial equivalence
is a device that was legally marketed prior to May 28, 1976 . . .”); see also, How to
Market Your Device U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ [perma.cc/QDH5-RXD2] (last visited June 22,
2019) (noting submitters “must compare their device to one or more similar legally
marketed devices and make and support their substantial equivalency claims.”).
80. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) Premarket Notification,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K790349
[perma.cc/L8XV-3SRF] (last updated June 17, 2019).
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component.81 At least one version of IB1 reached the market via the FDA’s
510(k) process.82
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a fixed metal backing was added to the
all-poly tibial component.83 Researchers believed that the metal backing “improv[ed] the transmission of load across the bone-implant interface” by improving force distribution.84 Surgeons noted that even though the all-poly IB1
appeared to be performing well, when revisions were performed, “the primary
mode of failure [was the] loosening of the tibial component due to poor [bone]
support of the tibial tray.”85 The metal-backed IB1 appears to have been approved via the 510(k) process in 1981.86
In the late 1980s, the next big step in tibial component design occurred
when the metal baseplate became removable or “modular.”87 The old nonmodular tibial component was seen as a primitive design with minimal sizes available and no side-specific implants.88 “Modularity” meant that the polyethylene
could be removed and switched to thicker or thinner inserts on top of the metal
tibial tray at the surgeon’s choosing – giving the surgeon added intraoperative
flexibility anticipated to improve outcomes due to a “multitude of sizes” along
with “advanced alignment and cutting tools.”89 In addition, surgeons could add
metal augments to the metal tray to fill in for bone defects and could attach a
long stem to the metal tibial post.90 The FDA approved the modular InsallBurnstein II (“IB2”) through the 510(k) pathway.91 In the mid-1990s, IB2

81. Insall et al., The Posterior Stabilized Condylar Prosthesis: A Modification of
the Total Condylar Design, 64 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 1317 (1982).
82. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80.
83. S. Stern & J. Insall, Posterior Stabilized Prosthesis: Results after Follow-Up
of 9 to 12 Years, 74 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 980 (1992).
84. Id.; D.L. Bartel et al., Performance of the Tibial Component in Total Knee
Replacement: Conventional and Revision Designs, 64 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 1026
(1982); J.L. Lewis et al., A Comparative of Tibial Component Designs of Total Knee
Prostheses, 64(1) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 129 (1982) (noting the single post, metalbacked design had the lowest stresses); Abdeen et al., Fifteen-Year to 19-Year FollowUp of the Insall-Burstein-1 Total Knee Arthroplasty, 25(2) J. ARTHROPLASTY 173
(2010); G.S. Gill et al., Long-Term Results of Kinematic Condylar Knee Replacement:
An Analysis of 404 Knees, 83(3) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 355 (2001).
85. Thomas J. Allardyce et al., The Insall-Burstein Posterior Stabilized Condylar
Knee Prosthesis, SURGICAL TECHNIQUES IN TOTAL KNEE ARTHROPLASTY 67 (2002).
86. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80.
87. Giles R. Scuderi et al., The Insall Legacy in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 392
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 3 (2001).
88. W.J. Long et al., Total Knee Replacement in Young, Active Patients: Longterm Follow-up and Functional Outcome: A Concise Follow-up of a Previous Report,
96(18) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. e159(1–7) (2014).
89. Id. at e159(5).
90. Scuderi et al., supra note 87, at 6.
91. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80.
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evolved into the NexGen Legacy Posterior Stabilized knee.92 The tibial component remained a modular metal-backed design but with some changes in the
shape of the polyethylene part when compared to IB2.93
While this particular line of TKAs was developing, numerous other companies were likewise developing, modifying, and marketing competing devices
along a somewhat parallel path to the IB line.94 By the 1990s, modular metalbacked designs were proliferating. Almost all knees of the modern era beginning in the 1990s incorporated metal-backed modular tibial components – not
the all-poly design.95 By the late 1990s, over thirty-seven different models of
TKAs were being made by fourteen different companies; one researcher noted
models were changing so fast that published data was difficult to interpret “owing to the frequent modification of the prostheses.”96 Over 100 tibial component designs were marketed from 1985 to 2005 with most no longer on the
market by 2014.97
The growth in numbers was massive. The first “modern” TKAs were
implanted in the mid-1970s.98 By 1980, around 40,000 TKAs were implanted
in the U.S. annually.99 The number of TKAs grew rapidly in this lucrative,
rapidly changing market and more than tripled to 140,000 per year by 1990.100
In the 2000s, TKA use surged and was expected to continue to grow. In 2017,
around 966,000 total knee replacements were implanted,101 and over 3.48 million are expected to be implanted annually by 2030.102 As the number of patients increases, the potential for significant harm related to a poorly analyzed

92. Scuderi, supra note 87, at 6 (describing the implant that the author (FMG) used
throughout his orthopaedic career).
93. Id.
94. R.Y.L. Liow & D. W. Murray, Which Primary Total Knee Replacement: A
Review of Currently Available TKR in the United Kingdom, 79 ANN. ROYAL C. SURG.
ENG. 335, 338, 340 (1997).
95. Since beginning my orthopaedic residency in 1992, I have never personally
witnessed a single non-modular tibial component being implanted by any of my professors or colleagues, nor did I ever personally implant a non-modular tibial component
in my career from 1992 through 2013.
96. Liow & Murray, supra note 94, at 338, 340.
97. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 6 (noting that “at least half of the implants
included in our study are no longer available”).
98. Scuderi et al., supra note 87, at 3.
99. Richard Iorio et al., Chapter 26: Economics of Revision Total Knee Arthroplasty: Increasing Prevalence, Decreasing Reimbursement in J.V. BONO, REVISION
TOTAL KNEE ARTHROPLASTY 269 (2005).
100. Id.
101. IDATA RESEARCH, Total Knee Replacement Statistics 2017: Younger Patients
Driving Growth (Jul. 18, 2018), https://idataresearch.com/total-knee-replacement-statistics-2017-younger-patients-driving-growth/ [perma.cc/283J-AA4D].
102. S. Kurtz et al., Projections of Primary and Revision Hip and Knee Arthroplasty
in the United States from 2005 to 2030, 89 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 780, 780 (2007).
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device likewise increases – especially in an area where there are already devices with proven track records.
510(k) played an important role in facilitating the rapid evolution of TKA
designs at a rate that limited researchers’ ability to analyze outcomes because
devices changed so fast that by the time significant outcome research was available, the design was already “outdated” and had been replaced by a newer version. Long term patient results of the “TKA races” are now becoming available
and are discussed below.

2. 510(k)’s Facilitation of Outlier Device Approval
The speed with which the FDA approves 510(k) devices and the limited
information required regarding clinical results has led to approval of at least a
few outlier devices; some of these outlier devices have had early, allegedly
poor results – significantly worse than their predicates – and as a result have
garnered legal attention. The FDA declares these outlier devices “substantially
equivalent” to their predicates, but they still can have alarming alleged rates of
complications leading to significant pain and suffering for affected patients.103
This Part provides a few examples.
An example of a nonmodular metal-backed tibial component that allegedly had worse outcomes in the 1980s and received some attention of products
liability attorneys was the Porous Coated Anatomic (“PCA”) knee.104 The cemented version of PCA was approved via 510(k).105 The design used a thinner
polyethylene surface that was heat pressed in fixing it to a special metal base.106
The PCA knee was initially very successful with promising early and intermediate term results.107 Eventually, however, excessive wear of the polyethylene part of the tibial component became evident and was often associated
with implant loosening.108 In one study of 487 consecutive PCA knees, there
was a 7% failure rate at an average of 4.5 years109 with a projected 20% failure
103. Medical Devices: Are Current Regulations Doing Enough for Patients?:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com.,
111th Cong. (2009) (opening statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, Representative from
Mich.).
104. D.S. Hungerford et al., The Porous-Coated Anatomic Total Knee, 13(1)
ORTHOP. CLIN. NORTH AM. 103–122 (1982); Amendola et al., supra note 77, at 205;
Comitini et al., supra note 77, at 109; Soren Toksvig-Larsen et al., Porous Coated Anatomic Total Knee Arthroplasties, 11 J. ARTHROPLASTY 11, 15 (1996).
105. 510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80.
106. A. Tsao et al., Failure of the Porous Coated Anatomic Prothesis in Total Knee
Arthroplasty Due to Severe Polyethylene Wear, 75(1) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 19
(1993); Hungerford, supra note 104; Amendola, supra note 77, at 205; Comitini et al.,
supra note 77, at 109; Toksvig-Larsen et al., supra note 104.
107. Toksvig-Larsen, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. Tsao et al., supra note 106, at 19.
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rate expected at six years.110 Experts considered the thinness of the polyethylene tray and the heat-pressure technique of preparation of the polyethylene
the likely culprits causing early PCA failures.111
The PCA knee received some products liability attention by courts in the
1990s. In 1996, in Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc.,112 the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower court’s finding that the cemented PCA knee in the case
was “unreasonably dangerous.”113 The opinion noted the manufacturer had
determined that the seven millimeter plastic tray was “too thin” and “eventually
advised doctors to stop using it.”114 At trial, the plaintiff’s expert witness described the manufacturing process such that “the polyethylene was processed
using heat, which made it susceptible to certain defects like pitting, scratching,
and ‘delamination,’ whereby the polyethylene breaks apart in layers.”115 The
manufacturer’s director of sales acknowledged that if the premature failure was
caused by “contact stresses, the use of heat to process the piece, and inadequate
polyethylene thickness,” the PCA knee “would be considered unsafe.”116 Additionally, in Bendocchi v. Howmedica, Inc.,117 the jury found the manufacturer
liable for failure to warn about the dangers of the PCA knee.118 Interestingly,
in the 2014 Mayo Clinic survivorship study,119 the PCA knee was not the worst
performer; in fact, nine of twenty-two TKAs had worse hazard ratios than the
PCA knee.120
Another example of a tibial component with questionable results approved via the 510(k) pathway is the Miller-Galante knee (“MG1”) knee.121 In
1986, the MG1 knee was first implanted, and it included a modular tibial component with cemented and uncemented porous-coated versions coated with a
titanium, aluminum, and vanadium alloy with improved biocompatibility predicted.122 The early results of the MG1 knee caused some researchers to “abandon this implant” due to “an unacceptably high rate of complications” within
two years of follow-up in one study.123
More recently, metal-on-metal total hip replacements (“MoM”) facilitated by 510(k) have received substantial legal attention. Even though early
Id. at 25.
Id.
662 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 1996)
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253.
2 F. App’x 711 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 715.
See discussion infra Section II.A.3.
Kremers, supra note 77, at 3 (Table 1).
510(k) Premarket Notification, supra note 80.
Comitini et al., supra note 77, at 109; Amendola et al., supra note 77, at 205.
C.H. Rorabeck et al., The Miller-Gallante Knee Prosthesis for the Treatment
of Osteoarthrosis, 75A(3) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 407 (1993).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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versions of MoM hips had high revision rates in the 1970–80s,124 MoM hips
reemerged in the late 1990s, and eventually over one million MoM hip replacements were performed worldwide after 1996.125 In March 2013, scientific studies revealed more trouble with MoM hips when researchers noted that “metalon-metal” total hips had “poor implant survival compared to other options and
should not be implanted.”126 In February 2016, the FDA reclassified two specific types of MoM hips as Class III and demanded that PMA applications must
be filed with the FDA if the “manufacturer wants to continue marketing their
MoM total hip replacement devices and/or market new MoM total hip replacement devices.”127 MoM hips have gotten substantial legal attention with thousands of lawsuits filed and billions of dollars in settlements already underway.128
Because outlier devices seem to slip through, 510(k) has proven to be a
poor process to recognize risks associated with apparent minor changes to predicate devices in some significant orthopaedic devices, which has led to allegations of significant injury to many patients.

3. Back to the Future: Orthopaedic Device Predicates Are Often Better Than Their 510(k) Descendants
At least two recent long-term studies suggest that the original all-poly
tibial TKA designs from the 1980s were likely to last longer than today’s TKA
designs. First, in 2014, Mayo Clinic researchers concluded, “the theoretical
advantages of the metal-backing of the tibial component may not necessarily

124. Brent M. Ardaugh et al., The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal Hip Implant, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97 (Jan. 10, 2013).
125. K.J. Bozic et al., The Epidemiology of Bearing Surface Usage in Total Hip
Arthroplasty in the United States, 91(7) J BONE JOINT SURG AM 1614–1620 (2009);
Michael Bolognesi & Cameron Ledford, Metal-on-Metal Total Hip Arthroplasty: Patient Evaluation and Treatment, 23(12) J AMER ACAD ORTHOP SURG 724–731 (Dec.
2015).
126. Alison J. Smith et al., Failure Rates of Stemmed Metal-on-Metal Hip Replacements: Analysis of Data from the National Joint Registry of England and Wales,
LANCET 1199, 1199 (Mar. 31, 2012) (emphasis added).
127. Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants: The FDA’s Activities, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm241769.htm
[perma.cc/A6U5PAM6] (specifically stating, “all manufacturers of MoM total hip implants are required
to stop marketing their devices and submit premarket approval applications that must
be approved before the devices can be marketed.”).
128. See, e.g., Jef Feeley, J&J Is Willing to Pay $400 Million-Plus in Hip-Device
Cases, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-12/j-j-issaid-willing-to-pay-400-million-plus-in-hip-device-cases
[perma.cc/QB5Y-4D7E]
(last visited June 22, 2019) (noting one device company is in the process of settling
“about 3300 of 10,000” lawsuits targeting just one line of its hip replacements).
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translate into clinical outcomes, and all-polyethylene designs can be successfully used in many patients with substantial cost savings.”129 The researchers
noted, “Our findings strongly suggest that all-polyethylene tibial components
performed significantly better than the metal-backed modular designs.”130
Specifically, during the twenty year period from 1985 through 2005, surgeons
at the Mayo Clinic used forty different types of tibial implants in performing
17,192 TKAs.131 When they studied the tibial implants, they found that
“(n)one of the components was associated with a lower risk of revision compared with . . . a component used in the mid-1980s.”132 The researchers reported that the older “all-polyethylene” designs performed “better” than the
more modern “metal-backed modular tibial designs.”133
Additionally, other researchers have similarly found better survivorship
of early designs. The early non-modular IB1 knees outperformed the more
modern descendent IB2 in a 2014 study where researchers found that “[a]t
thirty years, a significant difference existed in the survivorship . . . between the
non-modular Insall-Burstein I component (92.3%) and the modular InsallBurstein II component (68.3%).”134 In other words, only 7.7% of the nonmodular IB1s had to be revised within thirty years, whereas 31.7% of modular IB2s
were revised within a similar thirty-year period.135 Thus, IB2s were 4.1 times
more likely to require revision over thirty years. Multiple other studies have
likewise revealed that the older and cheaper all-poly design is likely superior
to the currently prevalent modular designs.136
The finding that older total knee designs were superior to new knee designs is not unique. Similar examples include the metal-on-metal total hip replacement and changes to the treatment of hip fractures. A British study of
400,000 total hip implant patients found a 6.2% failure rate for MoM hips compared to only 1.7% for older traditional total hip devices.137 Another recent
study suggests that the results of MoM hips appear to be inferior to traditional
total hips.138

Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 5 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5.
Long et al., supra note 88, at e159(1–7).
Id.
See e.g., T.J. Gioe et al., Current Concepts Review: The All-Polyethylene Tibial Component in Primary Total Knee Arthroplasty, 92A(2) J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM.
478 (2010); T. Cheng et al., Metal-backed versus all-polyethylene tibial components in
primary total knee arthroplasty, 82(5) ACTA ORTHOP. 589 (2011).
137. Smith et al., supra note 126.
138. William M. Mihalko et al., How Have Alternative Bearings and Modularity
Affected Revision Rates in Total Hip Arthroplasty?, 472(12) CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT.
RES. 3747–58 (2014).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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Similarly, a 2008 article authored by the Research Committee (“Committee”) of the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgeons (“ABOS”) reported a
“striking shift” unsupported by scientific findings to a new device (“Nail”)
from an older proven device (“Plate”) by newly trained orthopaedic surgeons
fixing hip fractures.139 The Committee found that over a seven year time frame,
young surgeons went from using the Nail only 3% of the time to fix hip fractures to using the Nail 67% of the time – a “striking” 2,133% increase in market
share for the Nail in just seven years.140 According to the Committee, the shift
to the Nail was not based on scientific evidence of improved outcomes for patients.141 The Committee noted “the only consistent differences found between
the two fixation techniques seem to be an increased rate of complications (particularly intraoperative and postoperative fractures) and a higher rate of reoperation in association with [the Nail].”142 The Committee noted that the
“consensus from the orthopaedic literature is that [Nail] fixation is associated
with a higher complication rate and no better outcomes,”143 in addition to
“higher implant costs and surgeon fees.”144 At least some of the Nail devices
were approved using 510(k).145

139. Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice: A Review of the American
Board of Orthopaedic Surgery Database, 90 J. BONE JOINT & SURGERY AM. 700, 700,
705 (2008) (noting the newer nail fixation for hip fractures was associated with “increased rate of complications” and “no better outcomes.” Also noting, “Our data, which
were collected from young orthopaedic surgeons in the beginning of their careers, confirm a higher rate of fracture and procedure-related complications and, at best, equivalent pain and deformity scores at the time of follow-up for patients managed with intramedullary nail fixation.”).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 706 (noting “higher implant costs and surgeon fees, with no improvement in patient outcomes”).
142. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) Premarket Notification,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K993670
[perma.cc/H23E-KQ5S] (last updated June 17, 2019); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
510(k)
Premarket
Notification,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K012158 [perma.cc/9YE3PGZ4]; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) Premarket Notification, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K020773 [perma.cc/UG6KVHMW] (last updated June 17, 2019).
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B. Analysis of FDA’s Recent 510(k) Changes on Orthopaedic Device
Outcomes
In 2011, the IOM stated that 510(k) was “flawed” and should be replaced
with an “integrated premarket and postmarket regulatory framework that effectively provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness throughout
the device life cycle.”146 However, Congress did not replace 510(k). This Section includes an analysis of whether the IOM’s goals were met by reviewing
the things that have not changed as well as the things that have changed with
the FDA’s recent 510(k) modifications.

1. Things that did not change
Considering the fact “that <5% of device-related complications were reported to the FDA,”147 the FDA remains bafflingly deferential toward device
manufacturers. 510(k) remains too deferential for devices implanted within or
affixed to large bones because (1) it is designed to be the “least burdensome
approach” for manufacturers instead of the best approach to protect patients,
(2) a benefit-risk assessment is not required for the majority of devices and
risks can be “mitigated” with labeling alone, and (3) it has too many exceptions.148
First, an overly deferential framework in favor of manufacturers impedes
510(k)’s effectiveness because the FDA designs 510(k) “to provide the least
burdensome approach for manufacturers”; the least burdensome provision says
that the FDA “shall only request information that is necessary” and “shall consider the least burdensome means of demonstrating substantial equivalence.”149
This means that for some types of device changes the “Quality System (QS)

IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 196, 210.
Day et al., supra note 2, at 522.
Id.
Deciding When to Submit a 510(k) for a Change to an Existing Device, U.S.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm514771.pdf [perma.cc/DLC7-LEMC].
146.
147.
148.
149.
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regulation” can be relied on as the least burdensome approach without requiring manufacturers to submit a new 510(k).150 The QS regulation basically requires some recordkeeping of the changed device.151 When the QS regulation
“can reasonably assure the safety and effectiveness of the changed device,”
submission of a new 510(k) may not be required.152
In addition, FDA guidance153 explains that reliance on postmarket controls like QS regulations, postmarket surveillance, and medical device reporting requirements will be considered as a mechanism “to reduce the extent of
premarket data for 510(k)s.”154 “In some cases, the FDA may accept greater
premarket uncertainty regarding a device’s benefit-risk profile through greater
reliance on postmarket controls, such as postmarket surveillance where applicable, in order to reduce the premarket burden for a 510(k).”155 So, the process
is tilted heavily in favor of device manufacturer convenience and facilitation
of change over consumer safety and efficacy requirements. While postmarket
surveillance may help identify devices that need to be recalled earlier, it does
little to protect the consumer from the unsafe device in the first place when it
has been affixed to or implanted within a large bone.
Second, according to the FDA, “a benefit-risk assessment is not recommended” or necessary for the majority of 510(k)s to support a determination of
substantial equivalence.156 Further, “despite differences in the benefit-risk profile, in some circumstances the new device may be determined to be substantially equivalent to the predicate device.”157 In addition, the FDA will consider
whether “mitigation strategies,” like labeling changes, are adequate to address
benefit-risk profile differences between the new device and the predicate device.158

150. See generally 21 CFR § 820 (2019); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
STATEMENT OF POLICY FOR REGULATING BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS, GUIDE TO MED.
DEVICE REG. APP. III (Cum. Supp. Nov. 2018) (hereinafter STATEMENT OF POLICY)
(noting, “Regardless of whether a change requires premarket review, the QS regulation
requires manufacturers of finished medical devices to review and approve changes to
device design and production (21 CFR § 820.30 and § 820.70) and document changes
and approvals in the device master record (21 CFR § 820.181). Any process whose
results cannot be fully verified by subsequent inspection and testing must be validated
(21 CFR § 820.75), and changes to the process require review, evaluation, and revalidation of the process where appropriate (21 CFR § 820.75(c)).”).
151. STATEMENT OF POLICY, supra note 150.
152. Id.
153. The Least Burdensome Provisions: Concepts and Principles, U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Feb.
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/73188/download
[perma.cc/446D-SN7Y].
154. FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 18.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Id. at 11.
158. Id.
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Finally, a 510(k) is not required to “develop, evaluate, or test a device” –
including clinical evaluation.159
For orthopaedic devices, the problem with this deferential approach and
failure to require a benefit-risk assessment is that seemingly innocuous changes
(as noted above in some outlier case examples) can lead to unexpected complications for patients with severe consequences clinically. Additionally, many
of these problems require mid- to long-term follow-up of clinical results to predict. Further, labeling strategies are of questionable benefit, at best, as discussed below.

2. Things that have changed: Numerous Holes in the November 2018
Changes
Unfortunately, the latest updates to 510(k) are unlikely to significantly
alter the long-term results of orthopaedic devices, unless some additional
changes are made, as noted below.
a. Increased Premarket Expectations for 510(k) Submissions
As described above, the increased premarket expectations are mostly paperwork requirements that can allow for “paper compliance” without real evidence of clinical safety and efficacy. The incorporation of risk/benefit factors
would be helpful if the standards for their use were not so deferential. As noted
above, the FDA states that “a benefit-risk assessment is not recommended” or
necessary for the majority of 510(k)s to support a determination of substantial
equivalence.160
One of the risks considered in benefit-risk assessment is the “rate of harmful events.”161 This “refers to the number of harmful events per patient or the
number of harmful events per unit of time associated with the use of the device.”162 The FDA considers harmful events, such as (1) “device-related serious adverse events” like death, life-threatening illness, permanent impairment
or damage, etc., (2) “device-related non-serious adverse events,” and (3) “procedure-related complications” like indirect anesthetic complications, etc.163
The probability of a harmful event reflects “the proportion of the intended population that could be expected to experience a harmful event,” and the “FDA

159. Premarket Notifications 510(k), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-notification510k [perma.cc/YU8J-2YWA] (noting “Please note that if you perform clinical trials
with your device, you are subject to the Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) regulation (21 CFR § 812).”).
160. FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 10.
161. Id. at 14.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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could factor whether an event occurs once or repeatedly into the measurement
of probability.” 164
The FDA needs to reconsider its benefit-risk assessment rules for devices
affixed to or implanted within large bones when there is already a predicate
device with good to excellent outcomes. The FDA should also emphasize statistical risk of unnecessary morbidity and mortality when similar devices are
already on the market to treat the specific orthopaedic malady. A closer look
at the clinical outcomes with regard to morbidity and mortality likely reflected
by the studies of all-poly versus modular metal-backed tibial TKA components
helps explain why the FDA should be less deferential with devices like TKAs
when it comes to benefit-risk assessment. Evolution of the TKA tibial component to today’s less durable and more expensive modular design facilitated by
510(k) has likely resulted in significant morbidity, mortality, and financial
costs with questionable resultant benefit at best.165 As calculated in the following paragraphs, almost 8,700 people likely have died or will die as a result of
revision surgeries related to the change from all-poly to modular metal-backed
TKAs, and many more have suffered unnecessary morbidity.166
Quantitatively, Mayo Clinic researchers in 2014 discovered that the allpoly knees had a hazard ratio of 0.3 compared to modular knees – meaning that
the all-poly knees were 0.3 times as likely to undergo a revision compared to
the newer modular designs.167 In a separate study, Kaiser-Permanente researchers likewise found a hazard ratio of 0.3 for all-poly tibial implants compared to modular metal-backed designs.168 Using the hazard ratio of 0.3 for
all-poly knees versus modular knees from the Mayo and Kaiser studies and
using established TKA volume data, it is easy to roughly estimate the past and
future costs of the changes to tibial design since 1990 – including morbidity,
mortality, and financial costs.
In the twenty-seven years between 1990 and 2017, around 13,438,238
TKAs were performed in the U.S.169 Using current techniques, the lifetime
risk of revision surgery for someone with a TKA is 16.5%.170 In the Mayo

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 1 (stating, “In comparison with metal-backed
modular implants, all-polyethylene tibial components had a significantly lower risk of
revision (hazard ratio, 0.3; 95% confidence intervals: 0.2, 0.5 [p < 0.0001]).”).
168. Vivek Mohan et al., Monoblock All-Polyethylene Tibial Components Have a
Lower Risk of Early Revision than Metal-Backed Modular Components, 84(6) ACTA
ORTHOPAEDICA 530, 530 (2013) (reporting results of a “[r]egistry study of 27,657 primary total knee arthroplasties”).
169. See infra App. A.
170. Alexander M. Weinstein et al., Estimating the Burden of Total Knee Replacement in the United States, 95 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. AM. 385, 390 (2013) (quoting a
rate of 14.9% for males and 17.4% for females; since 2/3 of primary TKAs involve
164.
165.
166.
167.
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Clinic study, about 80% of the knees used were modular designs; so, if 80% of
knees implanted during that time period were modular, then around 10,750,590
modular tibias were implanted from 1990 through 2016.171 So, if 16.5% of
those 10.75 million modular tibias needed revision surgery, then 1,773,847
people underwent (or will undergo during the life of the implant) revision surgery. If those 1,773,847 people had all-poly tibias, only 532,154 of them would
have to undergo revision surgery since the hazard ratio is 0.3 for the all poly
tibia compared to the modular tibia. Therefore, there will be a total of around
1,241,693172 people who must undergo a revision total knee surgery that theoretically would not have been necessary if the original design had not been
changed; hereinafter, I will refer to these as “avoidable revisions.”
The risk of perioperative death for revision TKA is around 0.7%.173 If
0.7% of those 1,241,693 people undergoing avoidable revision TKA surgery
die, then 8,692 people174 have died or will die unnecessarily as a result of modular total knees performed from 1990 through 2017. In addition, some people
have experienced or will experience avoidable, nonfatal, and costly life-altering complications related to those 1,241,693 avoidable revisions – estimated at
approximately 12,417 deep infections (1%),175 7,823 symptomatic deep venous
thromboses (DVT; i.e., blood clots; 0.63% rate),176 and 3,353 pulmonary emboli (0.27%).177
In addition, these 1,241,693 avoidable revision surgeries carry considerable financial costs. In 2016 dollars, each revision surgery costs around
$70,000 on average.178 Therefore, 1.242 million avoidable revisions from 1990
females, the gender adjusted risk is 16.5% for the entire population—mathematically,
(2/3 x 17.4 ) + (1/3 x 14.9) = 16.5).
171. Kremers et al., supra note 73, at 3 (stating, “Metal-backed modular tibial components constituted almost 80% of the tibial designs used in this cohort.”).
172. 1,773,847 minus 532,154 people.
173. Thomas Fehring et al., Mortality Following Revision Joint Arthroplasty: Is age
a factor?, 24 J. ARTHROPLASTY e85 (2010) (0.2% in patients <70 years old; 0.8% in 70
to 79; and 2.63% in >80 years old).
174. 0.007 x 1,241,693 million = 8,692.
175. Joint Replacement Infection, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC
SURGEONS, http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/topic.cfm?topic=A00629 [perma.cc/QG6DJYPA] (last visited June 22, 2019) (quoting 1% infection rate for TKA).
176. Gregory M. Martin et al., Complications of Total Knee Arthroplasty,
UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/complications-of-total-knee-arthroplasty [perma.cc/QYV5-AUM5] (reporting symptomatic DVT rate of 0.63% and PE
rate of 0.27%); Jean-Marie Januel et al., Symptomatic In-Hospital Deep Vein Thrombosis and Pulmonary Embolism Following Hip and Knee Arthroplasty Among Patients
Receiving Recommended Prophylaxis, 307(3) J. AMER. MED. ASSN. 294–303 (2012).
177. Martin et. al., supra note 176.
178. TKA prices are difficult to project because of wide variations between hospitals and suppliers. $70,000 is based upon the average of two studies and conversion to
2016 dollars. M. Bhandari et al., Clinical and Economic Burden of Revision Knee Arthroplasty, 5 CLIN. MED. INSIGHTS ARTHRITIS MUSCULOSKEL. DISORD. 89–94 (2013)
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through 2017 added or will add $86.9 billion in avoidable expense to the
healthcare system.179 Additionally, modular knees cost an average of $957
more per implant;180 if the 10.75 million people had received all-poly knees
instead of modular knees, then an additional $10.3 billion would have been
saved.181 Thus, from higher implant costs and unnecessary revisions alone,
$97.2 billion has been or will be unnecessarily spent on the modular knees performed from 1990 through 2017. This cost estimate is likely very conservative
because it does not include the morbidity costs associated with complications,
such as infection, DVT, PE, and other complications. Likewise, outlier implants with higher complication rates are not included.
Convincing evidence is lacking that 510(k) makes up for the losses sustained in TKAs with advances in other orthopaedic devices. Similar profiles
to the TKA tibial component outlined above could potentially be exposed with
regard to the other components of total knee replacement, to total hip replacements, to hip fracture treatment, and to other orthopaedic devices once more
specific data similar to the Mayo study is produced – as there is little evidence
that some of these components are better today than they were in the mid

(reporting $49,000 in 2012 dollars and adjusted to $51,510 in 2016 dollars using
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com); Carlos Lavernia et al., The Increasing Financial Burden of Knee Revision Surgery in the United States, 446 CLIN. ORTHOP. 221–26
(2006) (reporting $73,696 in 2006 dollars and adjusted to $88,228 in 2016 dollars using
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com).
179. $70,000 per revision x 1.242 million avoidable revisions.
180. Gioe et al., supra note 136, at 478.
181. $957 x 10.75 million.
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1980s.182 Several devices seem likely to have worse cost profiles than the modular, metal backed tibial component,183 and significant, proven device innovations to offset those costs are not readily and convincingly apparent. The consistent change with new devices is higher prices,184 not better outcomes for
patients.
Because well-established, safe, and effective devices are already on the
market for many orthopaedic devices, benefit-risk analysis should take into account these types of calculations in order to avoid unnecessary morbidity, mortality, and financial costs associated with 510(k).
“When reviewing a new device and assessing different technological
characteristics in accordance with this guidance, [the] FDA may consider postmarket data (e.g., literature, recalls, registry data, medical device reports) collected on marketed devices of the same type.” 185 The FDA should consider
the types of calculations above before clearing 510(k) orthopaedic devices that
are meant to treat orthopaedic maladies that already have treatments with excellent long-term outcomes.

182. The tibial component of total knees simply now has a few studies that have
produced specific hazard ratios to allow some simple computations; hopefully, similar
studies will be done for other orthopaedic implants in the future. Information Statement:
Current Concerns with Metal-on-Metal Hip Arthroplasty, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC
SURGEONS 1 (2012), https://www.aaos.org/uploadedFiles/PreProduction/About/Opinion_Statements/advistmt/1035%20Current%20Concerns%20with%20Metal-onMetal%20Hip%20Arthroplasty.pdf [perma.cc/M8K2-R757] [hereinafter AAOS
INFORMATION STATEMENT]; Michael P. Bolognesi et al., Metal-on-Metal Total Hip Arthroplasty: Patient Evaluation and Treatment, 23 J. AM. ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC
SURGERY 724, 724–25, 730 (2015) (noting issues with new metal-on-metal total hip
replacements compared to older designs); Kevin J. Bozic et al., The Epidemiology of
Bearing Surface Usage in Total Hip Arthroplasty in the United States, 91 J. BONE &
JOINT SURG. AM. 1614 (2009); Effectiveness of Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/metal-metal-hip-implants/effectiveness-metal-metal-hip-implants [perma.cc/RG4W-5WCM] (last updated
Mar. 14, 2016) (noting issues with new metal-on-metal hip replacements compared to
older designs); Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 139, at 705 (noting that the newer nail
fixation for hip fractures was associated with “increased rate of complications” and “no
better outcomes”); Wade R. Smith et al., Locking Plates: Tips and Tricks, 89 J. BONE
& JOINT SURG. AM. 2298, 2303, 2306 (2007) (noting claims of increased healing rates
with newer locking plates compared to older non-locking plates had “not been validated
in any type of controlled trial” and that “few series had validated the long-term advantages of fixation with locking plates”); James C. Bailey et al., Failure of the metal
backed patellar component after total knee replacement, 70 J. BONE & JOINT SURG.
AM. 668 (1988) (noting problems with newer metal-backed patellar components compared to older all-poly patellar components).
183. Bailey et al., supra note 182, at 668.
184. Kayode O. Oduwole et al., Increasing financial burden of revision total knee
arthroplasty, 18 KNEE SURG SPORTS TRAUMATOL ARTHROSC. 945, 945–48 (2010).
185. FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 18.
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b. Refuse-To-Accept Policy
The “Refuse-to-Accept” policy is basically a checklist that is used to
make sure applications are complete before the FDA deploys additional resources to analyze the proposed 510(k) device.186 In the sense that this makes
the FDA more efficient and preserves time and resources for complete applications, the policy could help with orthopaedic device approval because resources may be better spent and used more efficiently.187 However, since this
is again a regulatory policy focused on paper compliance and not a substantive
review, the effect on outcomes of the devices themselves is likely to be minimal.188 This bureaucratic requirement merely ensures that the FDA only reviews complete applications, improving the efficiency of the FDA, but otherwise does not affect quality or long term performance evaluation.

c. Improved Consistency and Thoroughness
The 510(k) SMART memo template now used by FDA reviewers provides guidance that should meet the goal of improving consistency and thoroughness in evaluating the paper compliance of 510(k) applications.189 The
links provided by the template should facilitate more consistent analysis and
help with documentation of pertinent information.190 Likewise, the frequent
updates will help facilitate consistency and help to make important information
available to FDA reviewers.191 FDA reviewers spend more time on each
510(k) application in part because of this program.192 However, this tool
mainly ensures that applicants follow checklists and that information is available, but it does not place any specific additional substantive requirements on
device manufacturers to ensure clinical safety and efficacy.193 It is hard to see
how this will improve the ultimate outcome of orthopaedic devices like those
mentioned earlier in this paper.

186. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 5.
187. Id.
188. FDA Refuse to Accept Policy, supra note 29, at 4 (explaining that this policy

only assesses completeness of the application, not quality or substance).
189. FDA Steps to Strengthen 510(k), supra note 8, at 6.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (noting that the FDA’s staff now spend more time reviewing each 510(k)
submission “than ever before.” The FDA estimates that its reviewers now spend twice
as much time reviewing each 510(k) as they did just 15 years ago and 32% more time
than they did in 2009).
193. Id.
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d. Elimination of 510(k) for Class III Devices
Elimination of 510(k) for Class III devices is a major step in the right
direction and would make a tremendous difference if more orthopaedic devices
were classified as Class III. However, a surprising number of orthopaedic devices that require very invasive surgery to be affixed or implanted within large
human bones deep within the body are still considered Class II, even though
they are associated with major potential complications up to and including
death.194 In fact, from 1992 to 2012, “94% of orthopaedic devices were categorized as class II” even though many were affixed permanently to large, deep
bones, and “during that same time period, orthopaedic devices were approximately thirteen times more likely to be cleared through the 510(k) process rather than the PMA process.”195
Examples of orthopaedic devices affixed to or implanted within large
bones still classified as Class II include: (1) bone fixation cerclage,196 (2) intramedullary fixation rods,197 (3) single/multiple component metallic bone fixation appliances and accessories,198 (4) smooth or threaded metallic bone fixation fastener,199 (5) most primary total hip replacement configurations,200 and
(6) most primary total knee replacement configurations.201
All of these devices can require deep dissection (to the bone) in the human
body and can be associated with major complications ranging from pulmonary
embolism to permanent disability to death. When modifications go bad, the
results can devastate patients’ lives. For example, until May 2016, these metal
on metal total hips with alleged major complications and multiple lawsuits
were Class II.202
For the majority of orthopaedic devices, which are still Class II, this
change will have minimal effect.

194. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522 (noting that “many high-risk implantable orthopaedic devices are miscategorized under class II and thus do not undergo PMA review”) (internal citations omitted).
195. Id.
196. 21 C.F.R. § 888.3010 (2019).
197. § 888.3020.
198. § 888.3030.
199. § 888.3040.
200. §§ 888.3310, 888.3340, 888.3350, 888.3353, 888.3358, 888.3360.
201. §§ 888.3500, 888.3510, 888.3520, 888.3530, 888.3535, 888.3540, 888.3560,
888.3565, 888.3590.
202. Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants: The FDA’s Activities, supra note 127 (specifically stating, “there is insufficient evidence and information to conclude that general
controls in combination with special controls would provide reasonable assurance of
the safety and effectiveness of these devices.”).
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e. Elimination of More Than 1000 Devices as Legal Predicates
If elimination of predicates is based upon outcome studies that demonstrate the eliminated devices have questionable patient outcomes, then predicate elimination could be an important step. Clearly, “the unknown risks that
. . . devices pose when they are cleared with inadequate predicates is a burden
that patients should not have to bear.” 203
Elimination of questionable predicates helps address “predicate creep.”204
Predicate creep is a 510(k) progression in which each generation of a new device evolves farther from any device that has been proven safe and effective
with clinical data because once the FDA clears a device by 510(k) or PMA it
can be used as a legal predicate.205 The cumulative design changes associated
with predicate creep can lead to devices with little resemblance to the original
predicate in a long “predicate chain,” which means the approved device is
likely only as safe and effective as the weakest link in the chain.206
However, the FDA should base elimination of predicates on clinical results regarding safety and efficacy (including those available in postmarket surveillance and in registry studies) and not on the age of the predicate. In some
cases, eliminating older devices as predicates could lead to worse devices
where some older devices have proven safer and more effective than their descendants, as noted above in the Mayo Clinic and Kaiser-Permanente studies
of total knees.207 Therefore, the predicate’s age should not be the main factor
(or necessarily even a factor) in determining whether the predicate can still be
used.
Unfortunately, the FDA focuses on eliminating predicates that are over
ten years old based upon a recent call for public comment.208 The FDA believes “[t]he most impactful way that we can promote innovation and improved

203. Arianne Freeman, Predicate Creep: The Danger of Multiple Predicate Devices, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 127, 139 (2014). (“The unknown
risks that Class III devices pose when they are cleared with inadequate predicates is an
unethical burden that patients should not have to bear.”).
204. Id. at 127–28.
205. Id. at 128; Fargen et al., supra note 4, at 272, 275 n.27. (explaining that once
the FDA clears a device via 510(k) or PMA, it can be used as a predicate for future
devices without new safety or efficacy proof).
206. Frank M. Griffin, Prejudicial Interpretation of Expert Reliability on the Cutting Edge Enables the Orthopaedic Implant Industry’s Bodily Eminent Domain Claim,
18 MINN. J. L. SCI. TECH. 207, 220 (2017).
207. Mohan et al., supra note 168, at 535.
208. Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. and Jeff Shuren,
M.D., Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, on Transformative
New Steps to Modernize FDA’s 510(k) Program to Advance the Review of the Safety
and Effectiveness of Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (November 26,
2018),
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safety in the 510(k) program is to drive innovators toward reliance on more
modern predicate devices or objective performance criteria when they seek to
bring new devices to patients.209 The FDA is “looking at ways to promote the
use of more recent predicates.”210 To meet this goal, “in the next few months
CDRH is considering making public on its website those cleared devices that
demonstrated substantial equivalence to . . . predicates that are more than 10
years old.”211
In orthopaedics, this could foreseeably lead to a worsening of the design
pool of predicates and weaken the safety and efficacy of new orthopaedic devices. While this change would be beneficial if newer devices performed better, recent studies noted above suggest the exact opposite is true in many
cases.212 Focusing on new predicates may even worsen the problem of “predicate creep” noted above as devices get farther and farther away from any device with long term follow-up studies or registry data.
IV.

ADDITIONAL PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Additional potential solutions to improve outcomes of orthopaedic devices approved by the FDA include (A) regulatory changes by the FDA, (B)
ensuring fairness in medical device products liability litigation, and (C) congressional action.

A. Regulatory Changes by the FDA
In addition to the changes noted above related to the FDA’s recent guidance, the FDA could potentially improve the results of orthopaedic device
modifications by reclassifying all implants affixed to or implanted within long
bones (e.g., the femur) as Class III devices.
Class III devices are those that “either ‘presen[t] a potential unreasonable
risk of illness or injury,’ or which are ‘purported or represented to be for a use
. . . which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health.’”213 The FDA subjects Class III devices to § 360e – the PMA process
– to “provide reasonable assurance of [their] safety and effectiveness.”214
For orthopaedic devices, the 11.5 times higher recall rate for 510(k) devices compared to PMA devices alone presents an “unreasonable risk of illness
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissionerscott-gottlieb-md-and-jeff-shuren-md-director-center-devices-and
[perma.cc/XJ25H2R7].
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Freeman, supra note 203, at 132.
213. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996) (citing 21 U.S.C §
360c(a)(1)(C) (1992)); 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012).
214. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012).
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or injury” because many of those recalled devices will require revision surgery
bearing a significant and unnecessary risk of injury.215 If those orthopaedic
devices were simply reclassified to Class III, then the recall rate would drop by
a factor of 11.5. In addition, when devices are available with proven long histories of safety and efficacy, modifications to those designs present “potential
unreasonable risk of illness of injury” by outlier implants as described above.216
Reclassification as Class III may have prevented some outlier devices from
reaching a larger market where clinical data is required on the front end, and
complications are avoided by restricting dispersion of the outlier device without more safety and efficacy data. Further, when new devices underperform
their predicates, the avoidable revisions and resultant morbidity and mortality
also represent an “unreasonable risk of injury or illness” – demonstrated by the
likely almost 8700 deaths discussed above related to changes in the tibial component of TKAs alone.217 If total knee replacements218 were simply reclassified as Class III, many of those deaths could likely have been avoided because
clinical data would have been required that may have beneficially throttled the
speed of the “TKA races.”
Total hips219 should also be moved to Class III for similar reasons. In
addition, the FDA should move orthopaedic plates and screws220 to Class III
because there are similar long-term proven devices and because risks of these
devices include complications like (1) plate or screw breakage or bending leading to revision surgery and its attendant risks of morbidity and mortality, and
(2) protruding screw tips injuring nerves (causing nerve damage), arteries
(causing bleeding), and other soft tissues.221 Similarly, intramedullary nails222
carry a risk of fat or air embolism, mechanical failure or breakage, penetration
of bones and joints, becoming stuck inside the bone, and other issues that can
result in serious morbidity and mortality.223 510(k) alone fails to adequately
assess the safety and efficacy of modifications of current proven designs of

Day et al., supra note 2, at 522.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
21 C.F.R. §§ 888.3500, 888.3510, 888.3520, 888.3530, 888.3535, 888.3540,
888.3560, 888.3565, 888.3590 (2019).
219. §§ 888.3310, 888.3340, 888.3350, 888.3353, 888.3358, 888.3360; Day, supra
note 2, at 522 (noting “only 15% of 510(k)-cleared total hip replacement devices had
published data on clinical effectiveness”).
220. § 888.3030.
221. Jason A. Lowe, Internal Fixation for Fractures, ORTHOINFO (April 2019),
https://orthoinfo.aaos.org/en/treatment/internal-fixation-for-fractures/
[perma.cc/7BNU-DPEJ];
(noting plates may break); John E. Lonstein et al., Complications Associated with Pedicle Screws, 81 J. BONE JOINT SURG. 1519, 1519 (1999).
222. § 888.3020.
223. Duke Orthopaedics, Complications of Femoral IM Nailing, WHEELESS
TEXTBOOK OF ORTHOPAEDICS, http://www.wheelessonline.com/ortho/complications_of_femoral_im_nailing [perma.cc/7WH9-N2BJ].
215.
216.
217.
218.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8

810

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

devices affixed to or implanted within large bones without significant clinical
data like that required by PMA.

B. Ensuring Fairness in Medical Device-Related Trials
Courts can improve orthopaedic recall and complication rates (1) by giving plaintiffs a voice and listening to arguments for liability against manufacturers (and possibly surgeons) under informed consent law and (2) by ensuring
the plaintiffs have a fair chance to prove design defect by fairly analyzing expert witnesses under Daubert.

1. State Tort Law: Informed Consent
The FDA often cites labeling as a method of “risk mitigation” in benefit
risk assessment of new devices with the FDA noting that “[e]ven if a new device has an increased risk and if the risk is appropriately mitigated, FDA may
determine that the new device has a comparable benefit-risk profile to the predicate device and therefore determine that the new device is ‘as safe and effective’ as the predicate device.”224 The FDA added, “The most common form of
risk mitigation is to include appropriate information within labeling (e.g.,
warnings, precautions, contraindications).”225 Further, the FDA stated, “Some
risks can be mitigated through other forms of risk communication, including
training and professional and patient labeling.”226
The FDA’s reliance on warning labels to mitigate risk is ineffective if
surgeons and patients are not aware of the warnings. In my experience, FDA
clearance information, device labels, and recall rates are rarely included in informed consent discussions regarding orthopaedic device implantations; often
the surgeon has not even seen the label. In addition, surgeons and patients
likely rarely understand the significance of 510(k) versus PMA clearance when
it comes to orthopaedic devices and rarely are aware which pathway a particular device took to clearance.227 Therefore, courts should hold manufacturers
and surgeons responsible for educating patients regarding the risks involved
with 510(k) clearance of orthopaedic devices during the informed consent process; allowing patients and surgeons to become more aware of these issues and
take them into account when choosing treatments would be a more “patientcentered” and “patient-driven” approach.

224.
225.
226.
227.

FDA BENEFIT-RISK FACTORS, supra note 25, at 17–18.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
Id.
Day et al., supra note 2, at 517.
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If the manufacturer properly educates the surgeon228 about the risks associated with its device (e.g., through effective warnings included in sales discussions), then the duty will fall upon the surgeon under the learned intermediary doctrine to properly inform the patient.229 When surgeons are unaware,
they cannot function as effective learned intermediaries.230 In those instances,
liability should remain with the manufacturer with regard to educating surgeons and patients. In order to avoid liability, the manufacturer should have to
transparently inform the surgeon of the data and FDA clearance pathway by
which the device reached the market (especially in orthopaedics where FDA
clearance pathway changes the recall risk by a factor of 11.5); in addition, manufacturers should be held liable where salesmanship dupes the surgeon into
believing the device stands on more solid scientific grounds than reality.231
Under informed consent doctrine, patient and physician notification of
orthopaedic device clearance pathway should be required because the much
higher recall rate of 510(k) orthopaedic devices makes the information material
to the patient’s decision to consent to the implantation of, and the surgeon’s
decision to use, the particular device.232
Informed consent “requires a physician to warn a patient of the risks and
consequences of a medical procedure.”233 This should include a fundamental
duty to warn patients of the risks and consequences of a procedure involving
an evolving medical device like a 510(k) device.234 Many regard the patient’s
right to participate in decision-making as one of the patient’s “most fundamental rights.”235 Informed consent fosters personal autonomy and doctor-patient
228. Id. (noting the clinical relevance of 510(k) information and saying, “When orthopaedic surgeons are considering using a new device clinically in their patients, it is
important for them to consider how the new device was approved by the FDA. If the
device was approved by the 510(k) pathway, then it may have been approved without
additional clinical studies confirming efficacy or safety.”).
229. Frank M. Griffin, The Trouble with the Curve: Manufacturer and Surgeon Liability for “Learning Curves” Associated with Unreliably-Screened Implantable Medical Devices, 69 ARK. L. REV. 755, 773–74 (2016); Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1,
§2[a] (1998) (explaining that in many jurisdictions under the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer cannot be held liable for failing to directly warn the consumer
as long as the consumer’s doctor, acting as a learned intermediary, was given adequate
warnings of the device’s inherent dangers).
230. See Kowalski v. Rose Drugs of Dardanelle, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 109, 120 (Ark.
2011) (stating physicians are in the best position to inform patients of risks of treatment); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970).
231. Kane, supra note 229, at 34–35; Schenebeck, 423 F.2d at 922.
232. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522.
233. Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Wlosinski v. Cohn, 713 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)) (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 150–51.
235. Y. Longtin et al., Patient Participation: Current Knowledge and Applicability
to Patient Safety, 85 MAYO CLINICAL PROC. 53, 54 (2010).
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communication; informed consent also allows patients to improve quality of
care where they understand the procedures that they undergo and can provide
feedback to the healthcare system.236 Informed consent is also important because it involves the public in medical decision-making, adding a layer of transparency to surgical decision-making.237
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) emphasizes “preference sensitive
care,” 238 which is defined as
[M]edical care for which the clinical evidence does not clearly support
one treatment option such that the appropriate course of treatment depends on the values . . . and preferences of the patient . . . regarding the
benefits, harms and scientific evidence for each treatment option, the
use of such care should depend on the informed patient choice among
clinically appropriate treatment options.239

Thus, the ACA advocates allowing the patient to hear about “each treatment option” and to use his or her own “values and preferences” in the decision-making process.240 In order for this to happen, surgeons or manufacturers
must educate patients regarding the recall risks and other risks (noted above)
associated with orthopaedic 510(k) devices. The ACA requirements may be
used as evidence in matters of state informed consent law.
Ultimately, the surgeon’s duty to warn of particular dangers is typically a
question to be submitted to the jury.241 Generally, a jury decides exactly how
much information should be disclosed to the patient.242 Courts commonly
adopt a rule that any “material risk” must be disclosed.243 “A material risk is a
risk which a reasonable person would consider significant in deciding whether

236. Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research
and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 365–376 (1974); Longtin et al., supra note 235,
at 53–54.
237. Capron, supra note 236, at 376.
238. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 936, 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-36(b)(2),
(d)(1)(A) (2012).
239. §§ 299b-36(b)(2).
240. Id.
241. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1960).
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Hill v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., 933 A.2d 314, 329–30 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000); Hahn v. Mirda,
54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191,
196 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 118 F. Supp. 2d 73, 81
(D. Mass. 2000), vacated sub nom Heinrich v. Sweet 308 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2002); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mitchell, 334 S.W.3d at 16–
17.
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to undergo a particular medical treatment.”244 Given the 11.5 times higher recall rate of 510(k) orthopaedic devices,245 many juries might decide that patients have a right to know when a device has been cleared by the riskier 510(k)
pathway in orthopaedic implant cases. An 11.5 times higher recall rate is likely
“material” to many patients in deciding to undergo a major orthopaedic procedure in which a device is affixed permanently to a large bone. Risks of 510(k)
devices should become part of the standard of care for informed consent disclosure to patients, so that patients and the public can have a say in which devices become mainstream.246
Second, many courts require surgeons to disclose reasonable alternative
treatment options.247 One court ruled that “where a physician or surgeon can
ascertain in advance of an operation, alternative situations and no immediate
emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternative possibilities
and given a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation.”248
Where established orthopaedic devices with proven track records are available
or where PMA devices are available, the surgeon should be obliged to disclose
these facts to obtain informed consent due to the huge difference in recall rates
and potential consequences related to use of the comparatively unproven device or the 510(k) device. As noted above, new implants often carry a risk of
death or disability statistically associated with avoidable revisions, and risks of
death or serious injury should always be disclosed under informed consent doctrine.249
Requiring surgeons to disclose 510(k) status and corresponding orthopaedic statistics gives patients a much-needed voice in these important decisions.
Patients may cast their 510(k) vote financially for safer and more proven devices if they are given the opportunity to actively participate in the process.

2. Ensuring a Fair Trial under Daubert in Medical Device Cases
Harmed patients deserve a voice on the issue of 510(k) devices that lead
to avoidable complications, and courts are often in the best position to provide
that voice. Courts should become less deferential to insider medical experts
and more diligent in recognizing the conflicts of interest (e.g., being on the
Hill, 933 A.2d at 330.
Day et al., supra note 2, at 517.
Griffin, supra note 206, at 755.
See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781; Sweet v. Sisters of Providence in
Wash., 895 P.2d 484, 493 (Alaska 1995); Miller v. Van Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143, 146
(Colo. App. 1980); Ray ex rel. Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569, 582
(Haw. 2011); Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958);
Stanley v. Chevathanarat, 664 S.E.2d 146, 149 (W. Va. 2008).
248. Bang, 88 N.W.2d at 190.
249. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787–78; Kapiolani Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d at 584;
Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960) (noting the physician must warn
of “possible serious collateral hazards”).
244.
245.
246.
247.
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company’s payroll, owning stock in the company, or receiving royalties on
sales of the device) that taint their opinions.250 Courts should realize that they
are often the last and best protection between patients and dangerous medical
devices, and that “the unknown risks that . . . devices pose when they are
cleared with inadequate predicates is a burden that patients should not have to
bear.”251 In addition, courts should stop shifting the blame for poor device
performance onto doctors and hospitals; preferential laws toward implant companies encourage lawyers to go after doctors and hospitals, driving up the cost
of medical malpractice in the healthcare market.252 Finally, courts should demand that patients be informed of the dangers of unproven medical devices as
part of informed consent doctrine to improve transparency for patients in the
decision-making process.
a. A Balanced Approach to Expert Testimony: Stop Favoring Insider Defendants’ Experts with Conflicts of Interest and Disfavoring Plaintiffs’ Experts
First, courts should be more critical in pre-trial Daubert rulings of insider
medical experts who will testify at trial.253 Courts have a tendency in their
Daubert rulings to favor industry experts and disfavor plaintiffs’ experts.254
One court stated, “Law lags science; it does not lead it.”255 However, courts
can distinguish insider bias and self-interest marketing from valid independent
scientific expert opinion testimony.256 Courts can look to author disclosure
statements in the orthopaedic literature as one source for evidence of conflicts
of interest, which orthopaedic publishers consider very important (with good
reason).257 Some paid orthopaedic implant consultant surgeons make millions
of dollars from their consulting agreements, royalties on devices, or other arrangements.258 One study found that insider surgeons report almost exclusively
positive outcomes with the devices in which they are personally invested – in-

250. Griffin, supra note 206, at 271 (noting, “A close look at some recent orthopaedic design cases supports the idea that judges are being too deferential in admitting
defense experts while being overzealous in excluding plaintiffs’ experts.”).
251. Freeman, supra note 203, at 139 (“The unknown risks that Class III devices
pose when they are cleared with inadequate predicates is an unethical burden that patients should not have to bear.”).
252. Griffin, supra note 206, at 268.
253. Id. at 271–72.
254. Id. at 271.
255. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996).
256. See Kanu Okike et al., Conflict of Interest in Orthopaedic Research: An Association Between Findings and Funding in Scientific Presentations, 89 J. BONE JOINT &
SURGERY AM. 608, 611 (2007) [https://perma.cc/6PUM-LEMM].
257. Griffin, supra note 206, at 248.
258. Id.
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cluding 100% of the surgeons with stock options, 98.4% of those with royalties, and 97.8% of those who were employees of implant companies reporting
positive outcomes in their scientific presentations.259 Another study found that
published results were only usually reproducible if less than 25% of the published data was reported by device developers when compared to data from the
joint replacement registries.260 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, the trial judge’s role is to “exclude unreliable expert testimony,” 261 and
unreproducible studies are unreliable by definition.
Orthopaedic journal editors consider it “essential that an author disclose
potential conflicts of interest.”262 The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons agrees and has a “Mandatory Disclosure Policy” for educational programs in which it requires presenters to disclose “relevant potentially conflicting interests or commercial relationships.”263 Similarly, many orthopaedic
journals – at least eighteen – have signed onto a consensus statement saying
readers of medical journals are “entitled to a full disclosure of all financial conflicts of interest of the authors of those articles”264 and agreeing to use the universal disclosure form developed by the International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors (“ICMJE”).265
Similar to orthopaedic journal readers, judges and juries are entitled to
full disclosure. Courts should develop disclosure forms like the ICMJE universal disclosure form and require all medical experts to fill out and sign this
form under penalty of perjury.266 Research has shown that even with disclosure
policies in place, compliance can be an issue. For example, one study showed
“a 46% nondisclosure rate of conflicts of interest among thirty-two orthopaedic
surgeons . . . who were known to have been paid over $1 million” in the year

259. Okike, supra note 256, at 611.
260. Gerold Labek et al., Impact of Implant Developers on Published Outcome and

Reproducibility of Cohort-Based Clinical Studies in Arthroplasty, 93 J. BONE JOINT
SURG. 55, 55 (2011).
261. FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment [hereinafter
FRE 702 Committee Notes]; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 579–93 (1993).
262. Vernon T. Tolo, Editorial, Orthopaedic Journals and Conflicts of Interest, 93
J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2145, 2145 (2011).
263. AAOS Mandatory Disclosure Policy, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS,
https://www.aaos.org/About/disclosure/?ssopc=1 [https://perma.cc/K6VR-T82H] (last
visited June 22, 2019).
264. Jeffrey S. Fischgrund, Conflict of Interest in Orthopaedic Journals, 20 J. AM.
ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 263, 263 (2012).
265. See Conflicts of Interest, INT’L COMM. MED. J. EDITORS., http://www.icmje.org/about-icmje/faqs/conflict-of-interest-disclosure-forms/ (last visited June 22,
2019); Griffin, supra note 206, at 247.
266. Griffin, supra note 206, at 249.
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before publication of their article.267 Therefore, the perjury penalty should
have teeth.
In addition, courts should stop deferring to industry polycentricity arguments,268 where medical devices have a history of innovation leaps documented
in their predicate chain that should be used to give plaintiffs’ experts a similar
degree of deference.269 With the roadmap of the implant companies’ own leaps
of “innovation” available in their 510(k) documentation, these conflicts are capable of rational resolution whether adjudication is easy or not.270
b. Stop Blame-Shifting Liability onto Hospitals and Doctors for Poorly Performing 510(k) Devices
Second, courts should stop allowing device-makers to shift blame to doctors and hospitals for failure of poorly researched medical devices. Unfortunately, doctors and hospitals likely often pay the price for early device failures
because the legal system makes malpractice claims much easier than product
liability claims in these complex cases. Device manufacturers often blame the
operating surgeon – even their insider experts – for the failures of their medical
devices.271 From a public policy standpoint, implant companies are in a much
better position than the public or doctors and hospitals to reduce the hazards
associated with their devices because the manufacturer can choose better premarket testing, can insure potential complications prospectively, and can perform better postmarket surveillance of its devices.
As noted in Escola, “[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent

267. Id. at 248; see also Kanu Okike et al., Accuracy of Conflict of Interest Disclosures Reported by Physicians, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1466, 1471 (2009).
268. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991).
269. Griffin, supra note 206, at 262.
270. James A. Henderson Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1538 (1973).
271. See e.g., Barry Meier, Surgeon vs. Knee Maker: Who’s Rejecting Whom?, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
19,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/business/20knee.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 [perma.cc/RR23-S9HP] (noting the company
suggested the surgeon’s “technique was the problem” when he reported problems with
an implant Dr. Berger noted, “Suddenly, I went from someone who was their master
teacher to someone who didn’t know what he was doing.”); Barry Meier, Doctors Who
Don’t Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/sunday-review/the-hip-replacement-case-shows-why-doctorsoften-remain-silent.html [https://perma.cc/778G-QCZ6] (Dr. Dorr noted, ““The first
thing that a company does is to put out a campaign that a surgeon does not know how
to operate” when problems are reported with a device, and Dr. Dorr was the victim of
a “whisper campaign”).
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in defective products that reach the market.”272 Since 88% of orthopaedic devices are cleared via the 501(k) shortcut compared to only 53% for other medical devices, the orthopaedic device manufacturers must be making a calculated
business decision to absorb the costs of the 11.5 times higher recall rate of
devices cleared via this pathway with resultant predictable patient injuries.273
Patients and society will benefit if the court system adjusts the calculus to make
company executives consider more premarket testing to lower recall rates by
placing risky devices through the PMA process prior to release on the general
public. Otherwise, “[t]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured.”274 It is a cost that the
implant companies should share and insure, since they are the ones who stand
to profit from the new – not better – devices. Doctors and hospitals should not
bear the cost by default.

C. Congressional Action
Congress should use programs already in place to encourage quality
among hospitals, doctors, and nursing homes as models to similarly encourage
quality among medical device makers. A “Medicare 510(k) Payment Reduction Program” should be instituted to help offset the costs to Medicare of the
11.5 times higher recall rate associated with orthopaedic 510(k) devices.275 In
addition, the government should create a MedicalDeviceCompare.gov website
to allow patients to participate in decision-making by comparing their medical
devices to other devices in the same category. Finally, residency programs
funded by the government should be required to train young doctors to use
proven devices instead of the latest 510(k) devices.

1. Introduction of a “Medicare 510(k) Payment Reduction Program”
Congress could start a new program – possibly named the “Medicare
510(k) Payment Reduction Program” – to offset the added costs to Medicare
posed by 510(k) device recalls and other 510(k) issues276 by ensuring that Medicare pays less for 510(k) approved devices than for PMA devices.

272. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944); see also,
Griffin, supra note 206, at 268.
273. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517.
274. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440; see also, In re Wagner, 530 B.R. 695, 697 (E.D. Wis.
2015).
275. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517.
276. See, e.g., discussion supra Section II.A (discussing tibial component of TKA).
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Models for such a program are already in place. The Affordable Care Act
included the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program,277 the Hospital Acquired Conditions Reduction Program,278 and the Value-Based Purchasing Program,279 which all shifted extra costs associated with hospital issues away from
government payers as described below. Congress should institute similar programs for 510(k) approved orthopaedic devices due to their higher recall rates
and associated costs.
The Medicare Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (“HRRP”) created by the ACA applies to most acute care hospitals.280 HRRP penalizes hospitals by reducing their reimbursement rates from Medicare by up to 3% if they
have “higher-than-expected readmission rates for a key set of conditions common in the Medicare population” and by making the penalty public.281
Similarly, Medicare penalizes hospital acquired conditions under its Hospital-Acquired Conditions Reduction Program, which focuses on reducing the
incidence of adverse safety events in hospitals.282 Under the program, Medicare uses patient safety measures to assign hospitals a Total Hospital Acquired
277. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) (codified in part as 42 U.S.C. § 3025 (2012)).
278. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2012).
279. § 1886(o).
280. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Social Risk Factors and Performance Under Medicare’s Value-Based Purchasing Programs: A Report Required
by the Improving Medicare-Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014,
HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS 70 [hereinafter HHS Report]; see also, Patient Protection
& Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1186(d)(1)(B) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 412.152 (2019).
281. HHS Report, supra note 280, at 70 (noting the maximum penalty was set at
3% in 2015, “where it will remain”); Cristina Boccuti and Giselle Casillas, Aiming for
Fewer Hospital U-turns: The Medicare Hospital Readmission Reduction Program THE
KAISER FAM. FOUND. MAR. 2017 ISSUE BRIEF 2 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Fewer-Hospital-U-turns-The-Medicare-Hospital-Readmission-Reduction-Program [perma.cc/4LVJ-F23Z] (noting, “The HRRP was established by a
provision in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requiring Medicare to reduce payments to
hospitals with relatively high readmission rates for patients in traditional Medicare.”).
The HRRP is especially punitive because “hospitals with readmission rates that exceed
the national average are penalized by a reduction in payments across all of their Medicare admissions – not just those which resulted in readmissions.” Id. After some adjustments, each hospital is annually assigned a penalty for the upcoming year based on
CMS’s calculation of that hospital’s rate of excess readmissions; “the greater each hospital’s rate of excess readmissions, the higher its penalty.” Id. The hospital’s penalty
is posted in the Federal Register and listed on the Medicare website) Id.; see also Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissions-reduction-program.html [perma.cc/4DKF-UP82] (last visited
Feb. 6, 2019) (explaining that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services uses “excess readmission ratios” to measure performance in treating conditions like chronic
lung disease, heart attacks, pneumonia, and coronary artery bypass surgery).
282. HHS Report, supra note 280, at 100.
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Conditions score and penalizes 25% of hospitals with the worst scores “a flat
1% of their total inpatient Medicare revenues” – including 1% of disproportionate share payments and medical education payments.283
Another example is Medicare’s Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, which redistributes a percentage – up to 2% – of hospitals’ Medicare
payments annually based on the hospital’s performance on quality measures
like (1) “clinical outcomes (e.g., mortality for patients admitted with pneumonia),” (2) “efficiency (costs of care per episode),” and (3) “safety measures
(e.g., in-hospital infection rates).”284
Given the 510(k) cost estimates above for the tibial component of TKAs
(almost $100 billion as calculated above) and the fact that Medicare paid over
$20 billion285 in 2010 for TKAs, the cost savings for TKAs alone could be
substantial; this is especially true considering that over 3.4 million people per
year (mostly paid for by Medicare) are expected to undergo TKAs annually by
2030.286 Further, “Medicare is responsible for paying for over 70% of all TKA
procedures in the United States.”287
Using those existing programs as models, Medicare’s Payment Advisory
Commission should review its payment policies and recommend lower payment rates for new 510(k) devices that threaten older established devices in
stable device markets with proven long term outcomes related to certain devices, like orthopaedic total knees and hips.288 Further, programs developed
under the Medicare Shared Savings Program should reward surgeons and Accountable Care Organizations who implant well-established devices while penalizing those who implant new, unproven 510(k) devices.289
To determine which techniques are “proven” or well-established, payors
should look to devices that have been approved by the PMA pathway over
510(k) devices, should discount studies published by the developers of the device in favor of independent studies, and should rely on emerging American
and established overseas registry databases. First, payors should favor devices
that the FDA approves by the PMA pathway over 510(k) devices by paying
less for 510(k) approved devices in areas where PMA-approved devices are
available.290 As noted earlier, the Institute of Medicine found that 510(k) is
“flawed”291 and is not a “reliable premarket screen for safety and effectiveness”

283. Id.
284. Id. at 143 (noting cap was set at 2% for 2017 and beyond).
285. Eric M. Padegimas et al., Medicare Reimbursement for Total Joint Arthro-

plasty: The Driving Forces, 98 J. BONE AND JOINT SURGERY 1007, 1007 (2016).
286. Kurtz et al., supra note 102, at 782.
287. Lavernia et al., supra note 178, at 221.
288. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-6(a)–(b) (2012).
289. § 1395jjj.
290. Day et al., supra note 2, at 522; Fargen, supra note 4, at 271.
291. IOM REPORT BRIEF, supra note 11, at 3.
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for many devices.292 There is a much higher chance (11.5 times higher in orthopaedics)293 that a device will be recalled when it does not undergo more
rigorous FDA approval through the PMA process; these recalls result in additional costs and morbidity associated with (1) repeat surgeries for revision, (2)
complications from those surgeries (such as DVT or infection), and (3) other
add-on expenses to the payment system that could have been avoided had the
new 510(k) device not been used. Orthopaedic devices are much more likely
to be cleared by shortcut FDA pathways than non-orthopaedic medical devices,
with 88% of orthopaedic devices cleared by the 510(k) process in 2012 versus
only 53% of nonorthopaedic devices.294 Payors should pay less for devices
cleared via 510(k) than those cleared via PMA until those 510(k) devices have
a proven track record.
Second, in analyzing devices, payors should discount studies published
by the developers of the devices and emphasize independent and registry studies when they assess the cost-effectiveness of medical devices. The orthopaedic literature is unreliable and biased because an inherent “positive outcome
bias” taints orthopaedic research when studies with positive outcomes have
historically been preferentially published over negative or neutral studies.295
Indeed, one study showed that 74% of published original papers reported positive outcomes,296 and another study estimated that 85% of orthopaedic epidemiology studies “may assert biased conclusions.”297 This “publication bias”
overestimates the clinical relevance of some orthopaedic implants by disregarding negative and neutral data that is not being published.298 Some authors
consider this bias to be a “severe challenge to patient safety.”299 Further, research quality is an issue with only 11.3% of orthopaedic studies using Level
1 evidence (the most reliable) and only 3% being randomized, controlled trials
(the gold standard for clinical research).300

Id. at 2; IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 193.
Day et al., supra note 2, at 522.
Id. at 520.
Erik A. Hasenboehler et al., Bias Towards Publishing Positive Results in Orthopaedic and General Surgery: A Patient Safety Issue?, PATIENT SAFETY SURGERY
(Nov. 2007).
296. Id. at 3–4.
297. Harman Chaudhry et al., How Good Is the Orthopaedic Literature?, 42 INDIAN
J. ORTHOPAEDICS 144, 146 (2008).
298. Hasenboehler, supra note 295, at 4 (“[T]rials with ‘significant’ results were
more likely to be published than studies with ‘non-significant’ data, by an adjusted
odds-ratio of 12.30.”).
299. Id. at 2; see also Mohit Bhandari et al., Meta-Analyses in Orthopaedic Surgery: A Systematic Review of Their Methodologies, 83 J. BONE AND JOINT SURG. 15, 15
(2001); David Moher et al., Epidemiology and Reporting Characteristics of Systematic
Reviews, 4 PLOS MED. 447, 455 (2007).
300. Chaudhry, supra note 298, at 146.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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Payors must learn to recognize industry-paid showmen (often including
doctors and lawyers) and look past their “razzle dazzle”301 to obtain solid information upon which to make decisions. Surgeons on implant companies’
payrolls are biased in their public presentations – with one study showing that
100% of those with stock options reported positive results.302 This is not surprising when the companies are less interested in finding scientists and instead
are “concerned only with identifying those surgeons who [are] the most likely
to be good salespeople for [their] products.”303
One way to overcome this bias is for payors to look to studies that involve
less than 25% of the data reported by the developers of the implant because a
recent study found “published results were usually reproducible in clinical
practice if [less than] 25%” of the data was reported by the developers of the
implant.304 In addition, payors should start looking more to registry data to
analyze clinical effectiveness as a tool for postmarket surveillance of medical
devices.305 The American Joint Replacement Registry is beginning to produce
significant data with 612 hospitals enrolled by 2015 and over 427,000 cumulative procedures followed in the database between 2012 and 2015.306 Other
countries have well-established and long-standing databases that can also be
analyzed. For example, joint registries in the U.K. and Australia played a major
role in detecting the problems associated with metal-on-metal hips.307 One author recently noted, “Registry data can contribute substantial added value to an
informed discussion of arthroplasty outcomes.”308
Before paying higher prices for new technology, payors should recognize
that device manufacturers need to “hit a home run” in order to improve the
already excellent outcomes for some procedures like TKA. According to a
study co-authored by researchers at Yale and Harvard, in order to be cost effective, an “innovative implant” must decrease actual TKA failure rates – not

BOB FOSSE AND FRED EBB, CHICAGO: THE MUSICAL.
Okike et al., supra note 256, at 610–11.
SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 286.
Labek et al., supra note 260, at 55.
IOM REPORT, supra note 11, at 11.
Annual Report 2016, AM. JOINT REPLACEMENT REGISTRY 1, 6 (2016),
http://www.ajrr.net/images/annual_reports/AJRR_2016_Annual_Report_final.pdf
[perma.cc/4TQN-E4E8]; David Ayers & Patricia Franklin, Joint Replacement Registries in the United States: A New Paradigm, 96 J. BONE AND JOINT SURG. 1567, 1568
(2014); All About the Data, AM. JOINT REPLACEMENT REGISTRY,
https://www.ajrr.net/enroll-with-us/all-about-the-data [perma.cc/26B2-F56S] (last visited June 22, 2019).
307. Brent M. Ardaugh et al., The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal Hip Implant, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 98 (2013).
308. Labek et al., supra note 260, at 55.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
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just radiographic wear – by at least 50%.309 If the patient has limited life expectancy due to comorbidities or advanced age, even higher success rates are
required for broad cost effectiveness.310
Therefore, reasonable clinical trials associated with PMA will likely be
required to justify added expenses associated with devices now being approved
using unproven 510(k) modifications. Theoretical changes and marketing
rarely, if ever, advance science. Therefore, as outlined earlier in this paper, it
is not surprising that changes to the tibial component of TKAs have led to billions of dollars of unnecessary costs. Real improvements will almost always
require hard work and real science – like clinical trials – and payors should stop
paying more money for less science.

2. Start “MedicalDeviceCompare.gov” to Give the Public Access to
Clearance Pathway Information and Statistics
Transparency is important. Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted, “When
you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can
count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength.”311 Louis Brandeis
also noted, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.”312
Congress seems to have adopted the transparency philosophy behind
these famous mantras because it adopted public websites allowing the public
to compare hospitals (i.e., HospitalCompare.gov),313 nursing homes (i.e.,
NursingHomeCompare.gov),314 and physicians (i.e., PhysicianCompare.gov).315 Why not adopt similar websites allowing patients to compare the
clearance pathway and reported results for orthopaedic (and other) medical devices and call it “MedicalDeviceCompare.gov”? Such a website would allow
market forces to influence device makers decisions regarding clearance pathway and pursuit of valid clinical data.
309. Lisa G. Suter et al., Placing a Price on Medical Device Innovation: The Example of Total Knee Arthroplasty, 8(5) PLoS ONE e62709 7 (May 2013).
310. Id.
311. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
312. Justice Louis D. Brandeis, BRANDEIS U., https://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html [perma.cc/9XYN-6FX8] (last visited June 22, 2019).
313. See Hospital Compare, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html? [perma.cc/N84Y-RWLR]
(last visited June 22, 2019).
314. See Nursing Home Compare, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/search.html?
[perma.cc/ML6QSJV6] (last visited June 22, 2019).
315. See Physician Compare, CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/ [perma.cc/5XPK-H3JY] (last visited
June 22, 2019).
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3. Medicare Should Make Sure Future Doctors Are Trained Preferentially Using Proven Medical Devices
Orthopaedic surgeons theoretically control which devices become popular and are implanted. Therefore, proper unbiased education – so that individual surgeons have a solid foundation upon which to make implant choices – is
essential to providing quality patient-centered care. Unfortunately, today’s
surgeons are often trained to use the newest devices – whether they are better
for the patient or not.316 Medicare and the Accreditation Council of Graduate
Medical Education (“ACGME”) are in the best position to regulate surgeon
training requirements because Medicare pays for training doctors (and later
pays for the implant choices of those same doctors) and ACGME oversees surgeon training programs.317
First, Medicare should get involved because Medicare pays both for doctor training318 and for the end results when bad device choices are made;319
therefore, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) should take a greater regulatory
interest in this area. Better surgeon training on the front-end rewards Medicare’s investment in physician training when those doctors perform patientcentered procedures later in their careers on Medicare patients.
Medicare is the “largest single program providing explicit support for
graduate medical education” paying an estimated $112,642 per resident trained
in 2010 with Medicare residency subsidies totaling over $10.1 billion annually.320 Further, two of the most expensive conditions billed to Medicare in
2013 included “complication of device, implant or graft” (costing Medicare
around $7.1 billion) and “complications of surgical procedures or medical

316. SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 284 (asserting that medicine functions primarily
as a “marketing arm of industry”); Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 139, at 705–06
(noting residents being preferentially trained in the device with poorer results). Likewise, as an example in my personal experience, I was trained to use modular tibial
components and have never personally witnessed any surgeon implant an all-poly tibia.
317. What We Do, AM. COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC., https://www.acgme.org/What-We-Do/Overview (last visited June 22, 2019) [hereinafter ACGME].
318. Catherine Rampell, How Medicare Subsidizes Doctor Training, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/how-medicare-subsidizes-doctor-training/?_r=0 [perma.cc/Y8TW-MQ5L].
319. Lavernia et al., supra note 178, at 221 (noting that Medicare pays for over 70%
of TKAs in the U.S.).
320. Medicare Payments for Graduate Medical Education: What Every Medical
Student, Resident, and Advisor Needs to Know, ASS’N OF AM. MED. CS., https://members.aamc.org/eweb/upload/Medicare%20Payments%20For%20Graduate%20Med%20Ed.pdf [perma.cc/G27J-V5RY] (last visited June 22, 2019); Rampell,
supra note 318.
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care” (costing an additional $2.9 billion)321 – both of which likely involved a
significant number of TKAs and other implants.322
Medicare is facing financial hardship.323 Concern over the increasing
Medicare expenditures related to TKA led CMS to implement reductions in
payment for physician services and hospitals for TKA.324 Specifically, surgeon
per-case reimbursement for TKA fell from “approximately $3000 in 1995 to
$1560 in 2009.”325 Growth projections for coming years indicate Medicare’s
TKA burden is going to get heavier.326 Therefore, funding for orthopaedic residency training programs tied to Medicare should be prefaced upon training
programs teaching residents techniques that are cost-effective and beneficial to
Medicare beneficiaries – not techniques that lead to higher costs, more revision
surgeries, and poorer health for its Medicare patients.
Medicare funding for graduate medical education flows to teaching hospitals through two separate streams: (1) Direct Graduate Medical Education
(“DGME”) funding covers resident and faculty salaries and benefits along with
some other overhead costs, and (2) Indirect Medical Education (“IME”) funding bolsters payments to teaching hospitals by adjusting individual hospitals’
inpatient rates to help defray additional costs associated with sponsoring residency programs.327 In 2010, IME payments accounted for 71% of the Medicare payments to teaching hospitals.328 IME payments are already adjusted
based on differences in local wages, disproportionate share of low-income patients, and other factors.

321. Celeste M. Torio & Brian J. Moore, National Inpatient Hospital Costs: The
Most Expensive Conditions by Payor, 2013, HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION
PROJECT STATISTICAL BRIEF 204 (May 2016), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb204-Most-Expensive-Hospital-Conditions.pdf
[perma.cc/FP329PGW].
322. Id.
323. Nick Timiraos, Social Security, Medicare Face Insolvency Over 20 Years,
Trustees Report,
WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/social-security-medicaretrust-funds-face-insolvency-over-20-years-trustees-report-1466605893
[perma.cc/35BG-LXK3].
324. Iorio et al., supra note 99, at 269.
325. P.B. Derman et al., The Role of Overweight and Obesity in Relation to the
More Rapid Growth of Total Knee Arthroplasty Volume Compared with Total Hip Arthroplasty Volume, 96 J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 926, 924 (2014).
326. Kurtz et al., supra note 102, at 782.
327. Graduate Medical Education that Meets the Nation’s Health Needs: GME Financing, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECH. INFO., U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK248024/ [perma.cc/8MTA-EXCE] (last visited June 2, 2019).
328. Id. (“Of the $9.6 billion Medicare paid to acute care teaching hospitals for
GME in 2010, about $6.8 billion (70.8 percent) were via the IME adjustment and $2.8
billion via DGME payments (29.2 percent).”).
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To improve surgeon training, HHS should add adjustments to the IME
payments based upon whether surgeons are being trained in proven, effective
medical device use. Residency training programs that demonstrate residents
are not being preferentially trained in newer, unproven 510(k) pathway devices
over older, proven, cheaper devices should get higher IME payments than those
that are exclusively training their residents to use more expensive and unproven
510(k) devices. In addition, Medicare could link IME payments to training in
procedures and devices that the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee evaluates and chooses.329 A board similar to the former Independent Payment Advisory Board330 or some other board or committee that could be charged with
device review. Medicare should stop indiscriminately paying for resident education in the newest and most expensive unproven techniques in order to help
solve long-term funding issues and ensure Medicare’s long-term viability.
Second, accreditation of residency training programs should be based on
training young surgeons to use proven techniques and devices. The ACGME
is a private, 501(c)(3), nonprofit organization that sets standards for U.S. graduate medical education in surgical (and other) residency programs.331 The
ACGME bases accreditation decisions on compliance with those standards.332
Standards should be added requiring training in best proven techniques and
devices, not just the newest 510(k) devices. Specific lists of proven device
classifications and techniques should be added to ACGME’s “Institutional and
Program Requirements” 333 as quality standards and chosen by independent organizations (like perhaps the ABOS334 and the AAMC335) acting as patient advocates. In the 2015-16 academic year, 830 ACGME-accredited institutions
sponsored around 10,000 residency and fellowship programs covering 150 specialties and subspecialties336 – making ACGME a potential powerful force for
change in this area.
ACGME accreditation should also be prefaced upon efforts by residency
training programs to eliminate industry influence upon professors and teaching
hospitals. In 2003, Professor Augusto Sarmiento wrote, “I feel comfortable in
stating that the education of today’s orthopedists is structured, to a great extent, to satisfy the marketing needs of industry,” adding that orthopaedic residents simply “learn to use industry’s tools.” 337
42 U.S.C. § 1395b-6(a)–(b) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (repealed Feb. 9, 2018).
ACGME, supra note 317.
Id.
Id.
About
ABOS,
AM.
BOARD
OF
ORTHOPAEDIC
SURGERY,
https://www.abos.org/about-abos.aspx [perma.cc/WGU2-TXLE] (last visited June 2,
2019).
335. About the AAMC, ASS’N OF AM. MED. CS., https://www.aamc.org/about
[perma.cc/55QR-Z7YN] (last visited June 2, 2019).
336. ACGME, supra note 317.
337. SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 284 (emphasis added).
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

47

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8

826

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Sarmiento’s observations appear to be validated by the findings of the
Research Committee (“Committee”) of the American Board of Orthopaedic
Surgeons (“ABOS”) in a 2008 article finding a “striking shift” to a new device
(“Nail”); this “shift” resulted in a 2133% increase in market share by newly
trained orthopaedic surgeons fixing hip fractures from an older proven device
(the “Plate”) although scientific findings did not support the shift – as described
above in section II.A.3.338 The Committee noted that the “consensus from the
orthopaedic literature” was that the “shift” to the Nail was “associated with a
higher complication rate and no better outcomes,”339 in addition to “higher implant costs and surgeon fees.”340 The Committee acknowledged the role of
resident education in the “striking shift.” To explain the shift, the Committee
noted that, “[i]t may be that younger surgeons are responding to a change in
training and that for some reason residents are currently being trained preferentially in [the Nail].”341 Young orthopaedic surgeons likely perform the procedures that they learned in residency training, and Sarmiento observed that
device manufacturers probably control that education process.342 In 2015,
companies gave $6.5 billion to doctors and teaching hospitals influencing research and patient care at academic medical centers.343
Orthopaedic residents likely “accept the reality . . . presented” during their
residency training programs by their attending professors – like Truman in The
Truman Show.344 Accrediting organizations, like ACGME, must do a better
job ensuring that at least some of the “reality” taught to residents is based upon
sound scientific evidence regarding safety and effectiveness and therefore,
likely to lead to reliable and good patient outcomes.345
Together, Medicare and ACGME are in the best position to help fix the
problem of newer, more expensive, and worse performing devices becoming
standard of care in the orthopaedic community.

338. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 139, at 704–06 (noting “our data, which were
collected from young orthopaedic surgeons in the beginning of their careers, confirm a
higher rate of fracture and procedure-related complications and, at best, equivalent pain
and deformity scores at the time of follow-up for patients managed with intramedullary
nail fixation.” and “higher implant costs and surgeon fees, with no improvement in
patient outcomes”).
339. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
340. Id. at 706.
341. Id. (emphasis added).
342. Griffin, supra note 206, at 209; SARMIENTO, supra note 69, at 200-01.
343. Chad Terhune, University of California OKs $8.5 Million Payout in Spine Surgery Cases, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 1, 2016), http://khn.org/news/university-ofcalifornia-oks-8-5-million-payout-in-spine-surgery-cases
[perma.cc/BUY5-RY37]
(last visited June 22, 2019) (commenting on federal data).
344. THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount Pictures 1998).
345. Griffin, supra note 206, at 209.
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CONCLUSION

Even though it is not sexy, policymakers would be wise to remember the
maxim, “The enemy of good is better,” and reign in the physical and financial
devastation left in the path of medical device “races” facilitated by easy 510(k)
pathways to device approval. There is little if any evidence that 510(k) facilitates real innovation. In fact, for orthopaedic devices, 510(k)’s past is checkered at best. Instead of facilitating innovation, there is evidence that orthopaedic 510(k) devices are 11.5 times more likely to be recalled than PMA devices.346 Similarly, there is evidence that 510(k) TKA devices have historically
not outperformed their predicate ancestors.347 In addition, some 510(k) outlier
devices unexpectedly underperform almost immediately and lead to relatively
quick legal attention, but not before many lives are negatively altered unnecessarily.348
The FDA changes to 510(k) could positively impact its shortcomings if
(1) a less deferential approach is taken toward device manufacturers, (2) more
information is required specific to safety and efficacy of the new device before
approval, (3) more emphasis is placed on risk benefit analysis and including
statistical analysis using simple math with comparison of existing proven devices, and (4) more orthopaedic devices are reclassified into Class III.
However, even these changes alone are unlikely to meet the goals of the
IOM’s recommendations regarding replacement of 510(k). Therefore, courts
should get involved by ensuring fairness in medical device products liability
and malpractice litigation by including medical device information in the informed consent process and by fairly analyzing witnesses on both sides in
Daubert rulings. Finally, Congress does not seem to have the appetite to replace 510(k) as recommended by the IOM, so it should take the following actions: (1) introduce a “Medicare 510(k) Payment Reduction Program” to hold
device manufacturers more accountable for the patient outcome costs of 510(k)
similar to other programs holding hospitals, doctors, and nursing homes responsible for added costs associated with the care delivered; (2) start “MedicalDeviceCompare.gov” to improve transparency by giving patients access to
device information similar to that provided for hospitals, doctors, and nursing
homes on HospitalCompare.gov, PhysicianCompare.gov, and NursingHomeCompare.gov; and (3) shore up medical education funding to ensure that Medicare pays for residency training programs that train surgeons to use proven
medical devices instead of the latest sexy 510(k) device.
With the changes outlined in this paper, orthopaedic medical devices
should be safer, more effective, and should produce better outcomes in the future.

346. Day et al., supra note 2, at 517.
347. Kremers et al., supra note 73; Mohan et al., supra note 168.
348. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF TKAS PERFORMED IN THE
U.S.
FROM 1990 THROUGH 2017.
Year

# of TKAs

Source

2017

966,000

349

2016

700000

350

2015

726000

351

2014

752941

352

2013

732570

353

2012

700064

354

2011

689381

355

2010

701213

356

2009

659745

357

2008

656872

358

2007

588266

359

2006

533448

360

2005

524223

361

2004

481400

362

2003

421700

363

supra note 101.
Martin et al., supra note 176.
Estimation: midpoint between 2014 and 2016 numbers.
HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT, FAST STATS: MOST COMMON
OPERATIONS DURING INPATIENT STAYS, https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/faststats/NationalProceduresServlet [perma.cc/6XHY-F6NK] (last visited June 2, 2019).
353. Id. (Year 2013).
354. Id. (Year 2012).
355. Id. (Year 2011).
356. Id. (Year 2010).
357. Id. (Year 2009).
358. Id. (Year 2008).
359. Id. (Year 2007).
360. Id. (Year 2006).
361. Id. (Year 2005).
362. C. Allison Russo et al., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT
STATISTICAL BRIEF #28, PROCEDURES WITH THE MOST RAPIDLY INCREASING HOSPITAL
COSTS, 2000–2004 6 (2007), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb28.pdf
[perma.cc/85HJ-K4SW].
363. Kathryn R. Fingar et al., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT,
STATISTICAL BRIEF #186 MOST FREQUENT OPERATING ROOM PROCEDURES PERFORMED
349.
350.
351.
352.

IDATA RESEARCH,
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2002

407100

364

2001

371600

365

2000

328152

366

1999

318152

367

1998

309200

368

1997

329000

369

1996

301794

370

1995

274587

371

1994

247380

372

1993

220173

373

1992

192966

374

1991

165759

375

1990

138552

376

Total

13,438,238

829

U.S. HOSPITALS, 2003–2012 4 (2014), https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb186-Operating-Room-Procedures-United-States-2012.pdf [perma.cc/P3CMCXJP].
364. Chaya Merrill et al., Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, Statistical Brief
#34, Hospital Stays Involving Musculoskeletal Procedures, 1997–2005 8 (2007)
https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb34.pdf [perma.cc/DY8U-EKW8].
365. Audrey J. Weiss et al., Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, Statistical Brief
#171, Trends in Operating Room Procedures in U.S. Hospitals, 2001–2013 3 (2014),
https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb171-Operating-Room-ProcedureTrends.pdf [perma.cc/U2C7-5G4M].
366. Russo et al., supra note 365, at 6.
367. Merrill et al., supra note 367, at 8.
368. Id.
369. Anne Pfuntner et al., HEALTHCARE COST AND UTILIZATION PROJECT,
STATISTICAL BRIEF #149, MOST FREQUENT PROCEDURES PERFORMED IN U.S.
HOSPITALS, 2010 2 (2013) https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb149.pdf
[perma.cc/H9DV-TZSC].
370. 1991 through 1996 were estimated by assuming a linear progression from the
138,552 cases in 1990 to the 329,000 in 1997.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Iorio et al., supra note 99, at 269.
IN
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